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The result of all this is that the good Samaritan who tries to help mayfind
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I. Introduction: Environmental Information and Regulatory Policy
Ideas to improve the effectiveness of this country's environmental
regulatory system are ubiquitous in the scholarly literature. Such ideas range
from relatively modest tinkering at the margins of the existing system to calls
for radical evolutionary reform.' A critical obstacle to any ability to correct
regulatory failures in the environmental protection arena is, however, the
absence of necessary information.2 Information is considered the "sine qua
non" of an efficacious environmental regulatory system.a This is especially true
in such areas as pollution control, natural resources management, and
regulation of toxic substances. 4 However, "a dearth of information of all kinds"
undermines our ability to regulate coherently areas of environmental concern.'
1. See generally THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NExT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (discussing ideas to shift American
environmental regulatory policy to "next generation" models); Debra S. Knopman, Easier to be
Green: The Second Generation of Environmental Action, in BUILDING THE BRIDGE: 10 BIG
IDEAS TO TRANSFORM AMERICA 163, 164 (Will Marshall ed., 1997) (discussing ideas for a
"second generation" environmental strategy); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to
Ready, Fire, A im: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85
KY. L.J. 803 (1997) (offering a "utopian" perspective for radical environmental regulatory
reform).
2. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 115, 117-18 (2004) ("In recent years,... disappointment has arisen over regulatory
failures--often traceable to information gaps-that remain pervasive despite numerous
regulatory reform initiatives."); Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The
Only Path to a Sustainable Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 148, 10,153 (1999) ("Next generation
authors recognize that the information and data systems that have served the bedrock regulatory
system of the last decades are not up to the task of addressing the environmental problems that
lie ahead.").
3. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 53 (1998) (discussing the "data deficit regarding
environmental pollution"); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information,
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 261 (1991) (stating
that "[i]nformation remains the sine qua non of the rational development of specific regulatory
commands regarding hazardous chemicals").
4. See Applegate, supra note 3, at 262-63 (stating that information particularly is needed
to regulate toxic substances); Esty, supra note 2, at 140-41 (outlining the pervasive information
gaps that plague environmental decisionmaking).
5. See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 3, at 269 (noting that this "dearth of information"
makes it impossible to tell whether environmental conditions are improving, to determine the
causes of problems, and to tell whether solutions are working). These authors note that "[t]he
current [regulatory] system lacks all kinds of necessary information-scientific and economic
information, information about actual environmental conditions (monitoring data), and
information about whether programs are working (program evaluation)." Id. at 289; see also
John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic
Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277,280-86 (1992) (discussing "scarcity of information"
affecting the regulation of toxic substances); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public
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Among the costs of such information deficiencies are pervasive uncertainty and
inefficiency in the environmental regulatory process.6
Information deficiencies are "unusually great" in the regulation of toxic
substances.7 Recognizing the danger to the public and to the environment from
exposure to hazardous chemicals,8 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) in 1976. 9 Largely intended to close the information gap in
Health, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 366-67 (2000) [hereinafter Steinzor, Devolution]
(discussing the "dearth of information" afflicting regulatory efforts in achieving actual quality
improvements in the environment); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation:
The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 103, 19 1-92
(1998) [hereinafter Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation] (arguing that gaps in
scientific information hobble environmental regulation by undermining the government's ability
to establish health-based standards); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the
Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773,774 (1997) (assessing responsibility
for "lack of toxicity information" on perverse incentives of common law tort liability system).
6. See Applegate, supra note 3, at 265 (explaining the causes and consequences of
uncertainty in the regulatory process). As Professor Applegate emphasizes:
The regulatory effect of uncertainty is, as in market transactions, inefficiency. The
agency simply does not know where to allocate resources or how much to allocate.
Lacking necessary information, the regulator cannot be certain what the problems
are, which problems are most pressing, what regulatory goals to set, how best to
achieve them, or even when they have been achieved.
Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM
RISKS: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GAO-99-17, at 17-18 (Jan. 1999) (outlining the
problems a lack of information creates), available at http://www.gao.gov/pas/cg99017.pdf (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The author goes on to say:
[The] EPA needs comprehensive information on environmental conditions and
changes over time to identify problem areas that are emerging or that need
additional regulatory action or other attention .... Absent this information, it is
difficult for EPA to set priorities, evaluate the success of its programs and
activities, and report on its accomplishments in a most credible and informed way.
Id.; see also Esty, supra note 2, at 140-41 ("[I]nformation problems represent a fundamental
issue holding society back from better results in pollution control and natural resource
management."); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MiCH. L. REV. 1795, 1796(1989) ("The lack of data has...
profoundly affected the law's attempt to deter and to compensate for chemical harms.");
Steinzor, Devolution, supra note 5, at 367 ("These yawning data gaps undermine all of our
efforts to establish priorities, assess risk, and achieve results.").
7. See Applegate, supra note 5, at 352 (commenting on the unusual degree to which
information is lacking for regulating toxic substances).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000) (finding that human beings and the environment are
endangered by both current and developing chemicals and that effective regulation of interstate
commerce in these chemicals requires regulation of intrastate commerce in the same); see also
S. REP. No. 94-698, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,4493 (stating that TSCA
evolved into "a comprehensive measure to protect the public and the environment from
exposure to hazardous chemicals").
9. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (2000).
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the area of toxic substances, TSCA allowed the acquisition of existing data
from chemical producers and processors and the creation of new data when
necessary.' 0 TSCA mandates that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issue a rule requiring testing to develop data on the health and environmental
effects of chemical substances once the agency makes certain findings." First,
the EPA must find either the existence of an "unreasonable risk of injury" to
health or the environment or that a chemical produced in "substantial
quantities" may reasonably be expected to enter the environment in such
quantities or to result in significant human exposure.' 2 Second, the agency
must find that insufficient data exist to reasonably determine the effect of a
chemical substance on health or the environment. 3 And, third, the agency
must find that testing this substance is necessary to develop sufficient data to
make such a determination.
4
As a policy tool designed to correct information deficiencies in chemical
toxicity data, TSCA has been a substantial disappointment.15  Almost two
decades after its enactment, commentators note that "only a handful of test rules
10. See Applegate, supra note 3, at 318 (stating that TSCA was designed to increase
information, to collect existing data, and to allow the creation of new data).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2000) (stating that, upon making the required findings, "the
Administrator shall by rule require that testing be conducted") (emphasis added); see also
Applegate, supra note 3, at 315 (stating that promulgation of a "test rule" is done through the
informal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act).
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a)(l)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2000) (listing the alternative findings the
Administrator must make, which are referred to as "A" or "B" findings); Holly E. Pettit, Shifting
the Experiment to the Lab: Does EPA Have a Mandatory Duty to Require Chemical Testingfor
Endocrine Disruption Effects Under the Toxic Substances Control Act?, 30 ENVmt. L. 413,424-
25 (2000) (listing the required findings under Section 4 of the TSCA). These include:
[S]pecifically, EPA must find that 1) either the chemical may present an
unreasonable risk to health or to the environment (an "A" finding) or it is produced
with substantial quantities (a "B" finding); 2) there is insufficient data to understand
the effects of the chemical; and 3) testing is necessary to develop such data.
Id.
13. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a)(l)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (2000) (describing the second set of
alternative findings the Administrator must make).
14. See id. §§ 2603(a)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (describing the third set of alternative findings
the Administrator must make).
15. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, Toxic IGNORANCE 23 (1997) (discussing TSCA's
"fundamental failure" to provide safety assurances on thousands of widely used chemicals),
available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/243_toxicignorance.pdf(on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking
the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
327, 330 (199 1) (noting "relatively modest" action taken under TSCA); Lyndon, supra note 6, at
1805 (observing that TSCA has failed to produce data at a satisfactory rate).
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have been promulgated under TSCA.' 6 By October 2003, the EPA only
issued "approximately thirty-one test rules under the statute, 'covering
approximately 114 chemical substances and mixtures.'" 7 One explanation for
EPA inaction under TSCA is "the elaborate procedural barriers that confine the
test rules" combined with a "relatively strict" evidentiary standard the agency
must meet to support such rules against judicial challenge." These "procedural
hurdles" render promulgation of TSCA test rules "a time consuming and
expensive process."' 9 Such costs, combined with the ease by which industry
can judicially challenge TSCA test rules, are primary factors contributing to
20agency inaction.
Professor Wendy Wagner observes that, in addition to such regulatory
failures, common law tort liability rules also contribute to the dearth of toxicity
information on commercial chemicals.2 ' In order to recover for harm caused by
exposure to potentially toxic products, the common law requires plaintiffs to
demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between the product and the
injury.22  Toxicity research revealing long-term risks of specific chemical
16. Applegate, supra note 3, at 318-19; see also ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 15, at 28
(stating that in twenty years, the EPA has used its Section 6 power to proceed against
unreasonably dangerous chemicals five times); Floumoy, supra note 15, at 330 (noting that the
EPA has restrictively regulated five chemicals under Section 6 of the TSCA, and by 1984, more
than 80% of the 48,000 generally used chemicals lacked toxicity information).
17. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 437
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
18. Applegate, supra note 3, at 319; see also ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 15, at 29-30
n. 15 ("Two appellate courts noted that EPA bears a higher burden ofjustifying regulatory action
under TSCA than under the traditional 'arbitrary and capricious' standard that applies to federal
agency actions generally." (citing Shell Chem. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1987) and
Auismont U.S.A. Co. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1988))).
19. Applegate, supra note 3, at 319.
20. See ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 15, at 29 n.15 ("Throughout TSCA's history,
chemical manufacturers have used the weaknesses of the law to sue EPA and delay its efforts to
require chemical testing."); DAVID M. O'BREN, WHAT PROCESS Is DUE? COURTS AND SCIENCE-
POLICY DISPUTES 129-30, 146-49 (1987) (explaining how the threat of litigation creates a kind
of "regulatory blackmail" as well as delay and inefficiency in promulgating regulations or
collecting data, especially regarding carcinogenic substances); Floumoy, supra note 15, at 362-
63 (noting how judicial challenges to findings and decisions impedes action and increases
costs); Pettit, supra note 12, at 425-26 (observing that the EPA seeks to avoid promulgation of
Section 4 test rules in part because of the burdensome nature of the requisite evidentiary
standard); see also Flournoy, supra note 15, at 363 n. 127 (stating that another factor to which
commentators attribute agency inaction includes the potential for "severe regulatory
consequences" should action actually be taken, which causes the agency to await a higher
degree of certainty before acting).
21. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 774 (noting that the common law tort system contributes
to the lack of toxicity information).
22. See id. (noting that the common law tort system requires the victims to produce
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substances, if available, would greatly assist plaintiffs in this effort. Therefore,
manufacturers are disinclined to conduct such research voluntarily in order to
minimize exposure to lawsuits and "potentially catastrophic liability. '23 By
thus rewarding the failure to conduct voluntary toxicity research, the common
law system encourages manufacturers to make the economically rational choice
of "remaining ignorant about the latent health risks of potentially toxic
products. ,24
Numerous studies have attempted to quantify the lack of toxicity
information on chemical substances used commercially in the United States. In
1984, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences
reported that no toxicity information existed for 80% of the more than 48,000
unregulated chemical substances then in commercial use.25 In 1997, an
environmental advocacy group, the Environmental Defense Fund (now
Environmental Defense), issued the Toxic Ignorance report "suggest[ing] that
more than 70% of highest-volume industrial chemicals in U.S. commerce
lacked sufficient data.., to conduct basic hazard assessments. 26 High-volume
chemicals are defined as those produced or imported in amounts of one million
pounds per year and are known as "high production volume" (HPV)
scientific research to show a cause-and-effect relationship between the chemical and their
injuries).
23. See id. at 775 (noting the self-incriminatory nature of voluntary safety research and
how this discourages companies from doing this research).
24. See id. (noting that manufacturers face no penalties for ignorance and risk enormous
liability if they learn of long-term dangers). Professor Applegate similarly observes that:
The emerging field of toxic torts is characterized by its lack of information for
decision making, and not by its ability to generate data. Again, the industrial
defendant is typically in the best position to create the necessary data, but its
incentives are the reverse. In the absence of dramatic changes to encourage
defendants to generate and disclose potentially inculpatory toxicity evidence, tort
law is unlikely to be a major factor in creating toxics data.
Applegate, supra note 3, at 299-300; see also Thomas 0. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary
Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 281,331 (2004) ("[E]xisting liability and regulatory laws create
perverse incentives on the part of externality-producing actors to conceal the information that
they do possess and 'to actively discredit and obfuscate damaging information' produced by
others.").
25. See Flournoy, supra note 15, at 330 (summarizing the Council's study that more than
80% of chemicals lack toxicity information); Wagner, supra note 5, at 782 (noting the lack of
toxicity information for the majority of chemicals). Both authors cite NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ToxicITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (1984).
26. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF., ORPHAN CHEMICALS IN THE HPV CHALLENGE: A
STATUS REPORT ii (2004), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/
3810_HPVOrphansReport_062004.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 15, at 7 (stating that almost 75% of the top volume chemicals
lack basic toxicity test results).
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chemicals.27 Toxic Ignorance prompted the EPA and the chemical industry
through the Chemical Manufacturers Association (now the American
Chemistry Council) to undertake more extensive studies.28 Both studies
confirmed that basic hazard-screening information was inadequate or
completely unavailable in the public record for more than 90% of domestic
HPV chemicals.29
Spurred by these findings, Environmental Defense, the American
Chemistry Council, and the EPA engaged in discussions regarding the need to
generate data on HPV chemicals. 30 These discussions led to the announcement
on Earth Day, April 21, 1998, by Vice President Al Gore and EPA
Administrator Carol Browner of the "Chemical-Right-to-Know" initiative.3'
The fundamental purpose for the initiative is to "assure that adequate
information is available to the public to assess risks for chemicals that are
present in the local environments. 3 2 The EPA further emphasizes:
Through the [Chemical Right-to-Know] Initiative, EPA intends to collect
health and environmental information to ensure that basic screening data
are available on all HPV chemicals. The data will provide the basis for
better and faster decisions on which chemicals present risks and how to
27. See Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (defining HPV chemicals); DENISON, supra note 26, at ii (offering a definition
of HPV chemicals).
28. See DENISON, supra note 26, at ii (describing further studies that Toxic Ignorance
motivated).
29. See id. at iii ("[M]ore than 90% of HPV chemicals lacked some or all screening-level
data at the outset of the HPV Challenge Program."); OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION &
Toxics, EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY: WHAT Do WE REALLY KNOW
ABOUT THE SAFETY OF HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICALS? 7 (1998) (stating that only 9%
of HPV chemicals met the data availability requirements for human health hazard screening),
available at http://www.epa.opptintr/chemtest/hazchem.pdf (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). See generally ICF KAISER INT'L, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF SIDS-RELATED
TESTING DATA FOR U.S. HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICALS (1998).
30. See Physicians Comm., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (describing discussions between
Environmental Defense, the American Chemistry Council, and the EPA on the need for more
data).
31. See id. (describing Vice President Gore's announcement on Earth Day); High
Production Volume (HPV) Chemical Initiative, Periodic Update Meetings, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,15 1,
24,152 (May 5, 1999) (describing the announcement of the HPV Challenge Program as a part of
the Chemical Right-to-Know initiative).
32. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & ToxICs, EPA, Chemical Right-to-Know Program
Frequently Asked Questions, 1, at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/rtkfaqs.pdf (last modified Aug.
21, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Data Collection and
Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,687
(Dec. 26, 2000) ("EPA's Chemical Right-to-Know (ChemRTK) initiative is being designed in
such a way as to make certain basic information about HPV chemicals available to the public.").
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eliminate or manage these risks. It is EPA's goal to assure that the public
has access to health and environmental effects data for chemicals which are
present in their environment. Improving EPA's and the public's
understanding of the hazards of chemicals most commonly used in this
country is a priority of this program.33
Following the launch of the Chemical Right-to-Know initiative, the EPA,
Environmental Defense, and the American Chemistry Council continued joint
discussions.34 These discussions eventually led to joint development of a
framework agreement for a key element of the initiative (the HPV Challenge
Program), which was publicly announced on October 9, 1998.35 This program
intends to narrow the public toxicity information gap by challenging the
chemical industry to perform certain testing voluntarily to generate previously
unavailable baseline health and environmental effects data for HPV
chemicals. 36 Consistent with the overarching Right-to-Know initiative, "[t]he
data generated through this program will be made available to the public" by
way of the Internet no later than 2005.3  Companies that manufacture or
import the chemicals included in the program were requested to take
responsibility for their testing voluntarily. 38 Following a specified period for
33. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, supra note 32, at 2.
34. See Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that these three organizations continued to dialogue regarding the need
to generate test data on HPV chemicals).
35. See id. (describing the formation of the HPV Challenge Program by the three
organizations and its October announcement); Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,692
(describing the HPV Challenge Program); RICHARD A. DENiSON & KAREN FLORIm, ENVTL. DEF.,
FACING THE CHALLENGE: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. HPV CHALLENGE PROGRAM 1 (2003)
(explaining the formation of the HPV Challenge Program), available at http://
www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2682_FacingtheChallengefinal.pdf(on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also EPA 's High Production Volume (HPV) Chemical
Testing Program: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Energy and Env't of the Comm. on
Science, 106th Cong. 119-20 (1999) (Joint Announcement of a Cooperative Program for High
Production Volume U.S. Industrial Chemicals (Oct. 9, 1998)) [hereinafter Joint Announcement]
(announcing the formation of ajoint testing program for HPV chemicals in a document jointly
executed by the American Chemistry Council, Environmental Defense, and the EPA).
36. See Physicians Comm., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (stating that the goal of the HPV
Challenge Program is to challenge the industry to collect data on 2800 HPV chemicals
voluntarily); Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,692 (outlining the goals of the voluntary
testing under the HPV Challenge Program).
37. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxucs, supra note 32, at 2-3 (stating that the
information will be made public); see also Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,692 (stating that
results will be available via the Internet); DENISON, supra note 26, at ii (stating that the data will
be available publicly in 2005).
38. See Joint Announcement, supra note 35, at 120 (inviting companies to participate in
the testing voluntarily).
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companies to volunteer, the framework agreement emphasized that the EPA
would use its rulemaking authority under Section 4 of TSCA "to compel testing
for [HPV] chemicals not 'volunteered."' 3 9 As an incentive to participate in the
voluntary program, the framework agreement states that a higher "degree of
testing flexibility" would apply to voluntary testing than for testing under a
regulatory test rule.40 Further, "[v]oluntary testing will not trigger the usual
TSCA reporting obligations imposed under a Section 4 program.
41
The HPV Challenge Program is an example of a collaborative approach to
environmental policymaking that found significant favor within the Clinton-era
EPA during the 1990s. During the latter half of the 1990s, collaborative
programs were at the heart of numerous EPA "reinvention" initiatives designed
to experiment with alternative approaches to traditional environmental
42regulation. Collaborative approaches to environmental protection policy
39. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Framework for Voluntary Testing of High
Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, at www.americanchemistry.com (July 25, 2000)
[hereinafter Framework for Voluntary Testing] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430,
434 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the EPA would require testing of chemicals not tested
voluntarily); Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,658,
81,662-64 (Dec. 26, 2000) (referring to proposed test rule under Section 4 of TSCA for thirty-
seven HPV chemicals for which the data needs are unmet).
40. Framework for Voluntary Testing, supra note 39.
41. Id. On December 26, 2000, the EPA announced another voluntary challenge
program-the Voluntary Children's Chemical Evaluation Program (VCCEP)-that is also a
component of the Chemical Right-to-Know initiative. See Voluntary Children's Chemical
Evaluation Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,700, 81,715 (2000) (stating that VCCEP is an EPA
challenge to industry to volunteer to sponsor testing and evaluation of twenty-three chemicals
deemed to pose a high risk of likely exposure to children and prospective parents and that
information generated through this voluntary program, similar to the related HPV Challenge
Program, eventually will be made publicly available by the EPA); OFFICE OF POLLUTION
PREVENTION & TOxICs, EPA, VOLUNTARY CHILDREN'S CHEMICAL EVALUATION PROGRAM
(VCCEP), http://www.epa.gov/chemtrk/vccep/index.htm (last modified Sept. 28, 2004)
("Thirty-five companies and ten consortia... volunteered to sponsor 20 chemicals.") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although this Article focuses primarily on the
HPV Challenge Program, much of its analysis is equally applicable to the EPA's VCCEP as
well.
42. For discussions of various EPA-initiated "reinvention" experiments aimed at reform of
the traditional environmental regulatory system, see David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental
Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50
EMORY L.J. 1, 39-89 (2001) (discussing "reinvention" and the EPA's Environmental
Stewardship Initiative); Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA
to Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 15-25 (1998)
(outlining the EPA's "reinvention" and streamlining efforts during the Clinton administration);
David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The
Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 613-19 (2000) (giving four
examples of "bargaining experiments" at the EPA, none of which fulfilled its expectations).
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encompass a wide variety of mechanisms, "from more flexible enforcement of
regulations to voluntary agreements, with much in between." 43  Voluntary
agreements can take the form of legally binding contracts, although many, such
as the HPV Challenge Program, take the form of nonbinding "gentlemen's
agreements. " 44 Nonetheless, voluntary agreements "are characterized by strong
expectations on the part of government that industry will comply," and, like the
HPV Challenge Program, "are typically accompanied by an explicit or implied
threat of regulation or other mandatory instruments should voluntary measures
fail., 45 Some voluntary challenge programs are less coercive in that there are
no threats of regulation or penalties for nonparticipation.46 A well-known prior
example of this type of program is the EPA's 33/50 program, a pollution
prevention initiative of the early 1990s to reduce releases of seventeen key toxic
chemicals reported in the Toxics Release Inventory.47
Potential benefits to the government from the HPV Challenge Program are
obvious. The government's attempts to develop this information directly
require substantial, indeed, cost-prohibitive taxpayer sums.48 Through the
voluntary challenge program, the private sector-those companies sponsoring
various HPV chemicals for testing-will primarily bear the costs of generating
43. Kathryn Harrison, Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to
Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 51, 52 (1998). For additional discussion of
public-private "partnerships" as a "collaborative redefinition of existing regulatory
arrangements," see EDWARD P. WEBER, PLURALISM BY THE RULES: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 9-12 (1998).
44. Harrison, supra note 43, at 56. The framework agreement underlying the HPV
Challenge Program states explicitly:
This document represents a framework under which companies agreeing to
voluntarily test HPV chemicals may do so consistent with EPA's Chemical Right to
Know initiative, and avoid a test rule. Because success will require extraordinary
cooperation and coordination among stakeholders, the framework itself is not an
enforceable agreement or contract.
Framework for Voluntary Testing, supra note 39.
45. Harrison, supra note 43, at 56.
46. See id. (noting that voluntary challenges involve few, if any, threats of regulations or
penalties).
47. See id. (listing the EPA's 33/50 program as an example of a voluntary challenge
program); see also Seema Arora & Timothy Cason, An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental
Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program, 28 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 271, 271
(1995) (noting that this program encourages firms voluntarily to reduce the release of seventeen
chemicals).
48. See Applegate, supra note 3, at 307 ("[G]iven the expense of this [toxicological
testing] research, the number of substances that can be investigated is extremely limited. There
will never be enough money in a federal or state budget to fill the existing data gaps on a
chemical-by-chemical basis."); Wagner, supra note 5, at 789-90 (discussing resource
constraints limiting government's ability to generate vital information by testing chemicals).
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the requisite information.49 Indeed, the framework agreement emphasizes that
"[u]nder this program, industry will voluntarily spend several hundred million
dollars creating valuable data in a few short years."50 Moreover, were industry
required to generate this information through a regulatory scheme such as
TSCA, substantial monitoring and enforcement costs would accrue, including
responding to the legal challenges that coercive regulatory approaches typically
produce.5 Other benefits from utilizing a voluntary challenge program include
the ability to generate, utilize, and provide the public with critical toxicology
information sooner than would otherwise be the case. In turn, industry
participants in the program benefit from public recognition as socially
responsible corporate citizens and from development of more favorable
program parameters than would have been the case with a program developed
exclusively by regulatory means. 2 In this specific instance, participating
volunteers avoid having to perform such testing under the less flexible
requirements of a TSCA test rule. 3
Notwithstanding the substantial benefits underlying the effort, the HPV
Challenge Program is subject, as are essentially all regulatory efforts, to the law
of unintended consequences. The concept of unintended consequences reveals
49. See Applegate, supra note 3, at 299 (observing that "industries that produce and use
chemicals ordinarily are in the best position to provide or obtain toxicity and exposure data most
cheaply and accurately").
50. Framework for Voluntary Testing, supra note 39.
51. See Harrison, supra note 43, at 58 ("Voluntary approaches are less costly than
regulation from government's perspective because industry bears the costs of monitoring and
shares the costs of standards development.").
52. In its written descriptions of the program, the EPA emphasizes:
Signing up for the Challenge Program provides an opportunity for recognition as an
industry leader on an issue of importance to the public. In the spirit of this right-to-
know initiative, the Agency would like to publicly recognize those companies
participating in the HPV Challenge Program on its Web Site http://www.
epa.gov/opptintr/chenrtk.
OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREvENTION & Toxics, EPA, HPVChallenge Program Frequently Asked
Questions, 15, at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/hpvfaqs.pdf (last modified Apr. 21, 2004)
(describing public relations benefits for companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
53. Specifically, the EPA states:
[Tihe voluntary program allows the use of chemical category approaches which
provide some flexibility in the tests to be conducted on each chemical in the
category; the test rule will not allow that flexibility. Additionally, the outputs of
the voluntary program will be detailed study summaries; the test rule will require
submission of entire studies for each of the SIDS test needed for each chemical.
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the often "perverse unanticipated effects of legislation and regulation.0 4 A
general example of an unintended consequence is a regulatory requirement to
clean up a water source causing an unforeseen increase in air pollution as a
result of the method chosen to clean up the water. A more complex example
occurs when a statutory provision is given an interpretation and application by
either regulatory agencies or the courts not intended by the legislature." Such
unintended consequences can have negative repercussions that seriously
undermine the originally intended goals by use of the regulatory mechanism in
question. This Article explores such an unintended consequence unforeseen by
the parties to the HPV Challenge Program framework agreement. The
implications of this unintended consequence have the potential to adversely
affect the EPA's future ability to utilize successfully voluntary programs as a
policy tool of choice.
This Article argues that voluntary sponsors of chemical testing under the
HPV Challenge Program are exposed to significant potential common law tort
liability. Specifically, such liability exposure arises under Section 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, an offshoot of the "Good Samaritan" doctrine
that holds "volunteers" liable for negligent performance of an undertaking
causing injury to third parties.56 As detailed in Part III, in the 1998 decision of
Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum,57 the Nevada Supreme Court upheld liability
imposed on a parent chemical company that voluntarily had undertaken safety
54. Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2002), http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/UnintendedConsequences.htmi (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging Businesses, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 307, 316 (2000) (discussing the impact of the "unintended
consequences" of governmental regulation). The author went on to say:
The rule of unintended consequences will forever plague our regulatory efforts. In
this regard, the government is no different than private actors, except that the
unintended consequences of government action tend to be much more widespread,
and the processes for adjustment to those unintended consequences are generally
less facile than the day-to-day workings of the marketplace. Our lives are complex
beyond our understanding, which means that our decisions, both public and private,
will always have consequences we do not anticipate and often do not want.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, The Legislation of Unintended Consequences, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 95, 95 (1998) (discussing application of Superfund liability to "disposal of
ordinary garbage" as an example of an "unintended consequence" that undermines Congress's
intended goals).
56. See infra notes 83-99 (comparing the Good Samaritan doctrine with Restatement
Section 324A).
57. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998), overruled in part by GES, Inc.
v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
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testing on chemical substances for a subsidiary manufacturing company.
58 The
court found the performance of this voluntary undertaking negligent.
59
Accordingly, a third-party purchaser of the subsidiary's products could recover
against the parent chemical company for injuries suffered through use of those
products solely on the basis of the voluntary, yet negligently performed,
chemical testing.60
Similar tort liability may attach to companies voluntarily undertaking
chemical testing through the HPV Challenge Program. Among others,
individuals in a position to claim injury by decisions made in reliance on
information disclosed through the program may have a cognizable cause of
action. Importantly, the EPA's stated intention for the HPV Challenge Program
is to provide the public with access to the information generated so that citizens
can utilize the information to make basic decisions regarding their daily lives.
In the EPA's own words, a primary purpose for pursuing information on HPV
chemicals is "to empower citizens with knowledge about... chemicals that
people may be exposed to in the places where they live, work, study, and play,"
as well as those "found in their environment" and in "the products that they
buy."'M Third-party reliance upon the information generated by the HPV
Challenge Program is a basic purpose of the program pursuant to the
philosophy of the Chemical Right-to-Know initiative.62
Part I of this Article outlines the pertinent components of the HPV
Challenge Program. Part III analyzes common law tort liability for "negligent"
chemical testing under the Good Samaritan doctrine and the precedent of the
Mahlum decision. Part IV argues that voluntarily testing specific chemicals
through the HPV Challenge Program exposes companies to such potential tort
liability. Part V concludes with a discussion of the policy implications for the
EPA as a result of this unintended consequence. This discussion considers the
potentially adverse effect of this unintended consequence on future use of
collaborative policy tools by the EPA. This Article concludes that such
58. See id. at 104-07 (outlining the various tests and upholding liability for "negligent
performance of an undertaking").
59. Id. at 107, 113-21; see also infra Part II.B (discussing Mahlum).
60. See Mahlum, 970 P.2d at 121 (upholding parent company's liability for negligent
testing); see also infra Part IIL.B (discussing Mahlum).
61. See Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals,
65 Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,687 (Dec. 26, 2000) (stating that the EPA wants to give citizens
information on chemicals in these various locations).
62. See id. (stating that the program is designed so people can assess the risks associated
with these chemicals).
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considerations may justify EPA efforts to secure immunity from such liability
for voluntary program participants.
II The HPV Challenge Program
Concurrent with the formal program announcement on October 9, 1998,
the EPA invited approximately 900 chemical companies to participate in the
HPV Challenge Program.63  To participate, sponsors-a company or a
consortium of companies working together-were asked to provide three items:
(1) a letter committing to sponsor specific chemicals from the EPA's 1990 list
of more than 2800 American HPV chemicals; (2) test plans either identifying
adequate existing Screening Information Data Set (SIDS) test data on
sponsored chemicals or proposing new testing deemed necessary to fulfill
complete SIDS testing requirements; and (3) a "'robust summary' . . . for each
existing and new study."64 Two "commitment" phases of the program-
collectively the "voluntary phase"-permitted companies until March 15, 1999,
and December 1, 1999, respectively, to volunteer to sponsor certain
chemicals. 6' During this period, commitments were made by "469 companies,
63. See Carol M. Browner, EPA, Letter to Manufacturers/Importers, Oct. 9, 1998, at
http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/ceoltrl.htm (last modified Aug. 14, 2002) (inviting companies to
participate voluntarily in the Challenge Program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). This letter states, in pertinent part:
This Challenge Program represents a powerful new direction in environmental
protection, one that offers the opportunity for EPA, the chemical industry, and the
environmental community to work together toward common goals. The citizens of
this country deserve to have basic health and environmental information about the
chemicals they come in contact with on a daily basis. For this reason, we need to
move quickly to close information gaps on the 2800 high production chemicals
identified today. We hope that, with the leadership of companies like yours, we can
accomplish this goal voluntarily and collaboratively.
Id.
64. Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,687, 81,692, 81,694 (stating that the chemicals to
be tested were on the 1990 list and the requirements for participating in the HPV Challenge
Program).
65. See id. at 81,693 (setting the dates for the commitment phases); see also Physicians
Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(describing the voluntary and regulatory phases of the HPV Challenge Program); Data
Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,687 (outlining the six basic testing endpoints that the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted as minimal
requirements to screen HPV chemicals for toxicity); David Roe, Ready or Not: The Coming
Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 627 (2002) (noting that the OECD developed
the SIDS program in 1990). These six testing endpoints are known as SIDS and include:
Acute toxicity; repeat dose toxicity; developmental and reproductive toxicity;
mutagenicity (gene mutation and chromosomal aberration/damage assays);
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individually or as part of 187 consortia ... to sponsor 2,155" chemicals under
the voluntary phase of the program.66 During a subsequent or "regulatory"
phase of the program, promulgation of proposed test rules are to occur under
Section 4 of TSCA for HPV chemicals not sponsored voluntarily.67 To date,
the EPA has proposed one test rule requiring chemical companies to conduct
SIDS testing on thirty-seven HPV chemicals not included in the voluntary
portion of the program.68
The HPV Challenge Program's stated goals are to:
(i) Ensure full public availability of [hazard] screening level data of HPV
chemicals.
(ii) Determine the adequacy of existing published and unpublished data to
maximize its use for HPV chemicals in order to avoid repeat testing. [and]
(iii) Conduct needed testing to ensure the availability of [hazard] screening
level data on HPV chemicals.
69
In pursuit of these objectives, all test plans and robust summaries initially
submitted by voluntary participants are made available for a 120-day public
review and comment period. 70 During this comment period, test plans are
evaluated by the EPA as to whether adjustments should be made for necessary
ecotoxicity (studies in fish, invertebrates, and algae); and environmental fate
(including physical chemical properties [melting point, boiling point, vapor
pressure, n-octanol/water partition coefficient, and water solubility]), photolysis,
hydrolysis, transport/distribution, and biodegradation. As conceived by the OECD,
the "SIDS battery" of tests can be used by governments to conduct an initial
assessment of the hazards and risks posed by HPV chemical substances and
prioritize HPV chemicals to identify those in need of additional, more in-depth
testing and assessment.
Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,687-88.
66. Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,694.
67. See Physicians Comm., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 434 (stating that the EPA intends to issue
rules in the regulatory phase regarding chemicals not tested during the voluntary phase).
68. See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,658,
81,658 (Dec. 26, 2000) (proposing a test rule for thirty-seven chemicals).
69. Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,692-93 (Dec. 26, 2000).
70. See id. at 81,692 ("The test plans that are submitted by the voluntary participants will
be posted 120 days before any testing is initiated, providing an opportunity for interested parties
to review and provide comments on the test plans, including technical comments regarding
alterations to the proposed test plans."); DENISON & FLORnM, supra note 35, at vi (noting that
after a test plan and robust summaries have been developed and submitted, they are available for
public comment).
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additional data development or testing beyond that initially proposed.7'
Subsequently, the sponsor performs additional testing and then "submits a
revised, now-complete Robust Summary."72 At the conclusion of this process,
all summarized data generated for each sponsored HPV chemical are made
available to the public.73 The ultimate goal is for all data produced through the
voluntary program to be made publicly available by the end of 2005. 74
However, in a 2003 evaluation conducted by Environmental Defense,
significant concerns were raised about whether the process is proceeding at a
pace to meet this deadline.75
Consistent with the "right-to-know" foundation of the program, the public
is able to track the progress of the sponsored HPV chemicals on the EPA's
Internet site.76 By the end of 2002, 194 test plans with accompanying robust
summaries covering 951 HPV chemicals had been filed.77 From January 2003
to July 21, 2004, 185 test plans and summary data were added to the online
data base.78 Significantly, the universe of HPV chemicals is a moving target.
The original core list of 2782 HPV chemicals derives from the 1990 TSCA
Inventory Update list.79 However, based on the 2002 TSCA Inventory Update,
more than 700 new chemicals have since emerged as HPV chemicals that were
not domestic HPV chemicals in 1990. 80 Given the Framework Agreement,
these new HPV chemicals are "not officially within the scope" of the voluntary
program. 8 1 The EPA anticipates that "over time, the testing of new HPV
chemicals will become routine, and companies may wish to test new HPV
chemicals as they appear.,
8 2
71. See Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,692 (stating that during the 120-day comment
period, the EPA will assess the sufficiency of the data submitted).
72. DENISON & FLORiNI, supra note 35, at vi.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
75. See id. at vii-xii (noting problems and offering recommendations).
76. Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,694 (Dec. 26, 2000).
77. DENISON & FLORri, supra note 35, at vii.
78. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge
Program: Robust Summaries and Test Plans, at http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/viewsrch.htm
(last visited Oct. 18, 2004) (listing submissions by date posted) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
79. DENISON, supra note 26, at iv n.8.
80. Id. at v.
81. Id. See generally Framework for Voluntary Testing, supra note 39.
82. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program:
The HPV Voluntary Challenge Chemical List, at http://epa.gov/chemrtk/hpvchmlt.htm (last
modified Aug. 26, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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III. Tort Liability for Negligent Undertakings
A. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A
A fundamental principle of tort law is that a person has no general duty to
take affirmative action to protect others from harm.83 Among the exceptions to
this "no-duty-to-act" rule is the Good Samaritan doctrine, which traces its roots
back to the seminal 1703 English case, Coggs v. Bernard.84 Common law
courts apply the Good Samaritan doctrine to impose liability upon a party that
voluntarily performs an undertaking causing injury to another through the
volunteer's failure to exercise reasonable care. 85 As Justice Benjamin Cardozo
notably emphasized while still a New York jurist, "[i]t is ancient learning that
one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.
86
Aspects of the Good Samaritan doctrine are captured in various provisions
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.87 The Restatement recognizes the
83. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 314, at 853 (2000) (asserting the general rule
that unless a party has assumed a duty or has a special relationship with another, there is no tort
liability for a failure to act in a way that would benefit another, even if the party foresees harm).
84. Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703); see also Annette T. Crawley, Note,
Environmental Auditing and the "Good Samaritan" Doctrine: Implications for Parent
Corporations, 28 GA. L. REV. 223, 234 (1993) (discussing Coggs). In Coggs, the defendant
voluntarily attempted to move casks of brandy owned by the plaintiff. 92 Eng. Rep. at 107.
During this activity, "one of the casks was staved, and a great quantity of brandy ... was spilt."
Id. The court held that, although the defendant originally was under no duty to move the casks,
upon voluntarily undertaking to do so, the defendant was liable to the extent the undertaking
was negligently performed. Id.
85. See Lisa L. Dahm, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A: An Innovative
Theory of Recovery for Patients Injured Through Use or Misuse of Health Care Information
Systems, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 73, 95 (1995) (noting that at common law, the
Good Samaritan doctrine imposed liability for a voluntary act that lacked reasonable care, even
where the act involved performing the duty owed by another person to a third party); Matthew
P. Bonham, Note, Bujol v. Entergy and The Good Samaritan Doctrine: Workers'
Compensation and Safety Regulations, Who Needs Them?, 63 LA. L. REV. 441, 442 (2003)
(asserting that the Good Samaritan doctrine traditionally has been used to find liability where
reasonable care was not exercised when performing a duty owed to a third party); see also
DOBBS, supra note 83, § 319, at 860-61 ("The general rule that undertakings can create a duty
of care is often expressed by saying one who voluntarily assumes a duty must then perform that
duty with reasonable care.").
86. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922); see also Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (stating that "it is hombook tort law" that a "good
Samaritan" must perform an undertaking in a "careful manner").
87. See Crawley, supra note 84, at 232 n.49 (observing that courts generally draw an
analogy between the Good Samaritan doctrine and the relevant sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts). The successive Restatements of Torts are developed by the American Law
Institute, which is comprised ofjudges, practicing lawyers, and law professors. MARSHALL S.
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general principle that voluntary undertakings "can create a duty to act
affirmatively and with reasonable care."88 Section 323 applies to undertakings
to provide services to another that an actor "should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things. 8 9 Section 324A also applies to
undertakings to render services to another but specifically focuses on the actor's
liability to third persons arising from the negligent performance of that
undertaking.90 Section 324A provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to [perform]91
his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm,
or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.92
In general, Section 324A's standard of liability for voluntary undertakings
"subsumes the well-known elements of any negligence action, viz., duty, breach
SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW I 1.02D, at 5-6 (2d ed. 2003). The Restatements are an
attempt to reduce the common law tort principles to "blackletter" rules. Id. 1.02D, at 5. The
Restatements are not binding on the courts but are persuasive authority intended to provide
courts with guidance in dealing with challenging problems. Id. at 6.
88. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 319, at 861.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 cmt. a (1965).
90. Id. § 324A cmt. a.
91. The published version of Section 324A used the word "protect" rather than the word
"perform." However, the reporter for the Restatement acknowledged that this is a typographical
error and that the correct word is "perform." See Hill v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112,
115 n.5 (5th Cir. 1970) (referencing letter from reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts
advising court of typographical error).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). The commentary to Section 324A
emphasizes:
[Tihis Section applies to any undertaking to render services to another, where the
actor's negligent conduct in the manner of performance of his undertaking, or his
failure to exercise reasonable care to complete it, or to protect the third person
when he discontinues it, results in physical harm to the third person or his things.
It applies both to undertakings for consideration, and to those which are gratuitous.
Id. § 324A cmt. b.
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of duty, proximate cause, and damages. '93 Specifically, a third-party plaintiff
asserting a prima facie cause of action under Section 324A must produce
sufficient evidence to establish five necessary elements. First, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a specific undertaking "to render services to
another. 94  Second, the injured third party must have been reasonably
foreseeable to the actor. That is, the plaintiff must establish the actor had
reason to foresee that the undertaking was necessary for the protection of third
parties.9s In this regard, the actor does not have to foresee the need for
protection of a specific individual; rather, it suffices that the plaintiff falls
within a "class of foreseeable third parties. 9 6 Together, these two elements
establish that the actor is under a legal duty to exercise due care in the
undertaking.
The third element the plaintiff must prove under Section 324A is that this
legal duty was breached by the actor's negligent conduct-that is, by the actor's
failure to "exercise reasonable care in the performance of the undertaking.
9 7
Fourth, the plaintiff must establish that the actor's failure to exercise reasonable
care was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's physical injuries." And, fifth, the
actor's negligent conduct must be demonstrated to be the proximate or legal
cause of the plaintiff's injuries through proof that at least one of three
conditions is met: either, that (a) the actor's negligent conduct "increased the
risk of such harm," or (b) the actor undertook to perform a duty owed by
another to third persons such as the plaintiff, or (c) "the harm was suffered
because either the other or the third persons relied on the [actor's]
undertaking. "99




96. Dahm, supra note 85, at 102.
97. Paz, 994 P.2d at 980 (citing Artiglio v. Coming Inc., 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998)).
98. Id. The requirement of"physical harm" in Section 324A means that the plaintiff must
demonstrate an injury to his person or property. Purely intangible economic loss is excluded as
an element of damages. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 319, at 861 n.5 (discussing identical
"physical harm" language in Section 323).
99. Paz, 994 P.2d at 980; see Ralph G. Wellington & Vance G. Camisa, The Trade
Association and Product Safety Standards: Of Good Samaritans and Liability, 35 WAYNE L.
REV. 37, 45-59 (1988) (discussing the three circumstances under which proximate cause can be
found under Section 324A). The term "proximate cause" is an often excoriated term generally
intended to separate the tort concept of legal causation-or legal limitations on the ultimate
scope of negligence liability-from that of factual causation. See generally Jim Gash, At the
Intersection of Proximate Cause and Terrorism: A Contextual Analysis of the (Proposed)
Restatement Third of Torts'Approach to Intervening and Superseding Causes, 91 KY. L.J. 523,
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B. Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum
Courts have applied the Good Samaritan doctrine to a wide variety of
voluntary undertakings. Commentators note that the doctrine's principles have
been applied "to a landlord making voluntary repairs on leased premises, to air
traffic controllers supplying information to pilots, to a private hospital
maintaining an emergency ward, and to the United States government
maintaining a lighthouse."' 0° The doctrine has been further applied to cases
involving an insurance company's voluntary inspection of an insured's
premises, workplace safety inspections or programs imposed by parent
corporations upon subsidiaries, a school athletics association's decision to make
safety recommendations to its members, and trade associations undertaking to
promulgate safety standards for its members.' 0 ' Of specific importance to this
Article, the Good Samaritan doctrine also has been applied in a number of
instances to voluntary undertakings to conduct scientific testing of chemical
substances.'02
Of the chemical testing cases, the most expansive in terms of potential
liability is the Nevada Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Dow Chemical Co. v.
Mahlum.'13 In 1985, the plaintiff in Mahlum received silicone gel breast
implants manufactured by Dow Coming Corporation ("Dow Coming").1 4 Five
years later she experienced deteriorating health and, in 1993, required surgery
to remove a ruptured implant. 0 5 The surgeon was not able to extract all of the
silicon gel, and a portion of it became permanently embedded in the plaintiff's
528-30 (2002-2003). For an explanation of the fact that although some courts and scholars
confusingly use "proximate cause" as an umbrella term covering the elements of both factual
and legal causation, many others utilize the term (as does this Article) as a distinct concept
incorporating only the latter aspect and as excluding cause-in-fact, see JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS:
PROXIMATE CAUSE 5 (2003).
100. Crawley, supra note 84, at 234-35 (footnotes omitted).
101. See generally id.; Kathryn Michele Glegg, Note, Negligent Inspection: Texas
Expressly Adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A in Seay v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., 41 Sw. L.J. 1041, 1041-42 (1987); Kimberly J. Todd, Note, Snyder v. American
Association of Blood Banks: Expansion of Trade Association Liability-Does It Reach Medical
Societies?, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 149, 164-65 (1997); Wellington & Camisa, supra note 99, at 38-
39.
102. See, e.g., Wellington & Camisa, supra note 99, at 39-40 (discussing Martinez v.
Perlite Inst., 120 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).
103. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998), overruled in part by GES, Inc.
v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (Nev. 2001) ("To the extent that our holding in Mahlum suggests that
concert of action requires no more than an agreement along with tortious conduct, it is
disfavored.").
104. Id. at 106.
105. Id.
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muscle, tissue, and blood vessels. 10 6 In September 1993, the plaintiff and her
husband filed suit in Nevada state court raising numerous claims against both
Dow Coming and its parent corporation, Dow Chemical Company (Dow
Chemical), claiming that the rupture of the implant caused the plaintiff to
develop "an atypical autoimmune disease."' 10 7 In May 1995, Dow Coming filed
for Chapter 11 protection in federal bankruptcy court, leaving the plaintiffs to
proceed to trial solely against Dow Chemical.'0"
Although Dow Coming, not Dow Chemical, manufactured and distributed
silicone products and materials, the plaintiffs alleged that Dow Chemical was
nonetheless directly liable for injuries relating to its subsidiary's products.' °9
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Dow Chemical was directly liable in tort:
[F]or fraudulently concealing information about the dangers of silicone,
conspiring with Dow Coming to effectuate such fraudulent concealment,
aiding and abetting Dow Coming's fraudulent misrepresentations about
silicone safety, acting in concert with Dow Coming to effectuate such
fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligently performing an undertaking-
testing the toxicity of liquid silicone-for Dow Coming. "0
At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on all of these claims except for
the conspiracy allegation.' The trial court entered judgment against Dow
Chemical for more than $4.1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million




107. Id. Dow Coming was formed in 1943 by Dow Chemical and Coming Incorporated
for "the express purpose of developing commercial and industrial uses for silicone technology."
Id. at 103. Dow Chemical and Coming Incorporated each own 50% of Dow Coming. Id. The
plaintiff raised claims against a number of defendants other than Dow Coming and Dow
Chemical, but all such claims were eventually dismissed. Id. at 106.
108. Id.; see Evan Caplan, Note, 'Milking the Dow': Compensating the Victims of Silicone
Gel Breast Implants at the Expense of the Parent Corporation, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 121, 126
(1997) (noting Dow Coming's Chapter I I filings in federal court in 1995). Dow Coming's
bankruptcy filing was precipitated by thousands of pending personal injury cases related to
silicone gel breast implants. Caplan, supra, at 125-26. Because of the automatic stay of claims
against the debtor accompanying any bankruptcy petition, the plaintiffs were forced to proceed
solely against Dow Chemical. Id. at 126-27. See generally 1I U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000).
109. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 106 (Nev. 1998),overruledinpartbyGES,




113. Id. at 106-07.
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On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that insufficient evidence
existed to support the plaintiffs' intentional tort claims." 4 Accordingly, the
Mahlum court reversed the judgment as to the claims based on allegations of
fraudulent conduct and vacated the corresponding punitive damages award." 5
However, the court nonetheless affirmed the $4.1 million compensatory
damages award, finding that substantial evidence supported the verdict against
Dow Chemical on the claim of negligent performance of an undertaking."
6
The Nevada Supreme Court relied on Section 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to analyze the plaintiffs' negligent undertaking claim.' '
7
Dow Chemical initially argued that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the
company had undertaken "a duty with respect to the specific product"-silicone
gel breast implants-that caused the harm in question. "8 The court, however,
emphasized that Dow Chemical's reading of Section 324A was "too narrow a
view of negligent undertaking analysis."'' 19 Rather, the court observed that
"[t]he proper focus of the inquiry [under Section 324A] is whether Dow
Chemical undertook to perform services to Dow Coming that Dow Chemical
should have recognized were necessary for the protection of third persons."'
' 20
Thus, liability for negligent undertaking does not have to relate to a "specific
final product" but "can arise when it is reasonably foreseeable that another will
be harmed by the failure to exercise reasonable care in performing... an
undertaking."' 
2
Dow Chemical further argued that the trial court erred in submitting to the
jury the question of whether the company owed a duty to the plaintiffs. 2 2 Dow
Chemical argued that such a question was a legal issue that must be resolved by
the court rather than the jury. 23 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this
argument based on case law construing Section 324A.' 24 Indeed, it is hombook
114. See id. at 109-13 (finding a lack of evidence to uphold the liability for fraudulent
concealment, concerted action to commit fraudulent misrepresentation, and aiding and abetting
fraudulent misrepresentation).
115. Id. at 113.
116. Id. at 113,124.
117. Id. at 113-21.
118. Id. at 114.






124. See id. at 114-15 (citing several cases, including Pratt v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
952 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1992), Artiglio v. Coming, Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Cal.
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tort law that whether a defendant in a negligence action owes a plaintiff a duty
of care is usually a legal issue for judicial determination. 125 The Mahlum court
emphasized, however, that in cases under Section 324A, the existence and
scope of a duty owed is dependent upon the nature and extent of the
defendant's undertaking.126 The nature and extent of the act undertaken by the
defendant is in turn a question of fact, which must be determined by the jury. 27
Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court held that "the jury was required to consider
the nature and scope of Dow Chemical's undertaking so that its concomitant
duty, if any, could be determined.'0
21
The Mahlum court ruled that the plaintiffs had introduced substantial
evidence from which the jury could determine that Dow Chemical had
undertaken to perform services that it should have recognized as necessary for
the protection of third persons. 129 Specifically, the evidence reflected that Dow
Chemical had undertaken to render services to Dow Coming to test the safety
of the liquid silicone eventually used in the Coming breast implants. 130 From
1943 until 1968, Dow Coming lacked its own toxicology laboratory and staff to
perform toxicological testing. '31 "From the 1940s until the 1970s, 'every
organosilicon compound' made by Dow Coming was sent to Dow Chemical for
toxicological testing."' 32 Because Dow Coming relied so extensively on Dow
Chemical's toxicological facilities and expertise, and based on factors
demonstrating the strong relationship between the two companies, the court
found that the jury had more than sufficient evidence from which to determine
the full nature and extent of Dow Chemical's undertaking.1
33
1998), and Smith v. State, 921 P.2d 632, 634 (Alaska 1996), for support).
125. See generally DOBBS, supra note 83, § 226, at 577-78 (discussing the role ofjudges
with regard to the issue of duty).
126. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 114 (Nev. 1998) (referencing Pratt v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1992), Artiglio v. Coming, Inc., 957 P.2d
1313, 1318 (Cal. 1998), and Smith v. State, 921 P.2d 632, 634 (Alaska 1996), for support),
overruled in part by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d II (Nev. 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 115 (citing Smith, 921 P.2d at 635)
129. Id.
130. Id. at 103.
131. Id. at 105.
132. Id. at 104.
133. Id. at 114-15. Specifically, the court summarized the evidence relating to the nature
and extent of Dow Chemical's undertaking as follows:
(1) Dow Chemical's creation of and fifty percent ownership of Dow Coming,
(2) Dow Chemical's control of one-third of Dow Coming's board of directors,
(3) Dow Chemical's undisputed expertise in toxicology, (4) Dow Coming's lack of
a toxicology laboratory until 1968 and reliance on Dow Chemical's toxicological
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The court also found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
reasonably "infer that Dow Chemical should have known that the services it
rendered," including "its toxicological testing of Dow Coming's liquid silicone,
were a necessary step in the protection of third persons who would purchase
liquid silicone in the form of breast implants.' 34 This included evidence that:
Dow Chemical knew prior to the 1970s that other silicone materials
developed for medical purposes were being used as implants, knew that
liquid silicone was being developed for medicinal uses, and knew at the
time of [certain toxicological] tests that Dow Coming was using liquid
silicone in its breast implants....
The court emphasized that it was not necessary for Dow Chemical to foresee
that this chemical substance would be specifically used in breast implants. '
36
Instead, it was enough that Dow Chemical could reasonably foresee that "its
testing was being relied upon to develop products that would be implanted in
humans" in some form or fashion.137 Dow Chemical "acted with awareness of
the general class of persons" to which the plaintiff, as an eventual recipient of
silicone breast implants, belonged.33 Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court found
that Dow Chemical was under a legal duty to such foreseeable third parties to
exercise reasonable care in undertaking to perform chemical safety testing for
Dow Coming. 1
39
The Nevada Supreme Court next looked to Section 324A's commentary
for guidance as to the scope of Dow Coming's duty of care. The Court said:
[The commentary] explains that the section "applies to any undertaking to
render services to another, where the actor's negligent conduct in the manner of
expertise, (5) the housing of Dow Chemical's and Dow Coming's toxicology
laboratories in a Dow Chemical building from 1968 until 1971, (6) the myriad tests
performed by Dow Chemical on silicone compounds and the specific tests relating
to silicone fluids, (7) the continuing assistance rendered to Dow Coming by Dow
Chemical personnel, and (8) Dow Chemical's 1966 joint development agreement,
1969 information development agreement, and 1975 trademark agreement with
Dow Coming.
Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 116.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting In re Silicone Gel Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455,1461 (N.D. Ala.
1995)).
138. Id. (quoting Artiglio v. Coming, Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1323 (Cal. 1998) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting)).
139. Id. at 1l6-17.
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performance of his undertaking, or his failure to exercise reasonable care to
complete it, or to protect the third person when he discontinues it, results in
physical harm to the third person."
40
Based on this language, the court emphasized that "once Dow Chemical
undertook to test and advise Dow Coming on the safety of liquid silicone, it
was obligated to fully complete this course of conduct.' 41 Moreover, if the
undertaking were discontinued at some point, Dow Chemical "was required to
[act if necessary to] protect Dow Coming's consumers."042 In light of the
evidence presented at trial, the Mahlum court held that the jury could
reasonably infer that Dow Chemical breached its duty to foreseeable third
persons in both of these respects. 1
43
First, the Mahlum court ruled that evidence adduced at trial rendered the
jury free to conclude that Dow Chemical's undertaking-toxicity testing of
liquid silicone-had been negligently performed. 144 In this regard, the court
indicated that the jury was entitled to credit the testimony of the plaintiffs'
expert witness who asserted that Dow Chemical had responded inadequately to
initial silicone testing suggesting danger rather than safety. 145 Specifically, the
plaintiffs' expert testified that Dow Chemical should have designed and
conducted follow up testing sufficient to confirm or reject such initial results or
at least should have advised Dow Coming of the need for such studies.
146
Instead, what little follow-up testing Dow Chemical did perform was
inadequate, inasmuch as results were misreported and findings were again
suggestive of problems rather than safety. 147 Having undertaken to test the
safety of Dow Coming's liquid silicone, reasonable care required Dow
Chemical "to fully complete this testing until a reliable safety determination
was made.'
48
140. Id. at 117-18 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A cmt. b (1965)).




145. See id. (referring to and quoting from the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness).
146. Id.
147. Id. The court quoted the plaintiffs' expert's testimony:
My opinion is a very clear and forceful one that whatever long term testing they did
do was inadequate. The results were misreported. The findings were suggestive of
problems rather than safety. And in the aggregate, there was absolutely no basis for
assuming long term safety based on the animal testing.
Id.
148. Id.
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Second, the Mahlum court ruled that Dow Chemical was additionally
negligent "by failing to intervene in the marketing of Dow Coming's breast
implants.' 49 Specifically, the court held that the evidence supported a finding
that Dow Chemical could have, and thus "should have used its influence to halt
the marketing of Dow Coming's silicone breast implants until the long-term
effect of silicone breast implants on humans was understood and these products
were determined to be safe.' so By failing to completely test the liquid silicone
for safety and subsequently compounding that omission by failing to take some
action to protect foreseeable third parties thereby placed at risk, the court held
that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dow Chemical had negligently
performed its undertaking to test liquid silicone.''
As further required under Section 324A, the Nevada Supreme Court found
that the evidence also supported the jury's conclusion that Dow Chemical's
negligence was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's physical harm.5 2 That is, had
Dow Chemical taken action to prevent Dow Coming from marketing its breast
implants or had Dow Chemical exercised reasonable care in testing the liquid
silicone for safety, the plaintiff would not have suffered injuries from the
implants.' 53 Significantly, the Mahlum court noted that the appreciable length
149. Id.
150. Id. The court emphasized that the evidence suggested Dow Chemical had "a
significant level of control over Dow Coming and its products. Dow Chemical certainly had the
authority to influence Dow Coming and to assert direct pressure on Dow Coming through
[their] trademark agreement. Dow Chemical, however, did nothing." Id. at 120.
151. Id. at 119.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 119-20. In this regard, the Mahlum court's analysis is a straightforward
application of the "but-for test" of the cause-in-fact element of the negligence action. That is,
"but-for" the negligent conduct of Dow Chemical, the plaintiff would have avoided her injuries.
See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 168, at 409 (describing the but-for test under which the
defendant's conduct must be necessary to cause the plaintiffs injury and, without which, the
injury would have been avoided). However, in an earlier portion of its opinion, the Mahlum
court also ruled that substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defective
breast implants manufactured by Dow Coming were the cause of the plaintiff's physical injuries.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 107-08 (Nev. 1998), overruled in part by GES, Inc.
v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001). This finding was a necessary condition precedent to any
finding that Dow Chemical's negligent undertaking-failure to exercise reasonable care in
conducting toxicity testing of Dow Coming's chemical substances-was also a cause-in-fact of
the plaintiffs physical injuries. Id. With respect to this "scientifically controversial component
of the plaintiff's case"-whether her injuries were caused by exposure to silicone-the court
emphasized as follows:
The Mahlums... did not need to wait until the scientific community developed a
consensus that breast implants caused her diseases. If she had, it might have been
too late to recover, in light of the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitation and
repose. The Mahlurs'... complaint was not tried in the court of scientific
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of time between the plaintiff's injuries in the 1990s and the decade's earlier
period when Dow Chemical was performing safety testing for Dow Coming did
not absolve Dow Chemical of liability. 54 The court emphasized that "[t]he
consequences of a negligent defendant's act under Section 324A may come to
fruition many years after its undertaking has ended, and still the courts have
found that liability may exist."'
55
Finally, the Mahlum court found that the plaintiffs presented sufficient
evidence to satisfy the proximate cause aspect of Section 324A. 1 6 As noted
above, Section 324A requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that at least one of
three conditions is present: (a) that the defendant's negligence increased the
risk of harm to the plaintiff, (b) that the defendant undertook a duty owed by
another to the plaintiff, or (c) that the harm was suffered because either the
other owing the duty or the plaintiff relied on the defendant's undertaking.'1
7
Based on the evidence presented, the court concluded that the jury could
reasonably conclude that conditions under both subsections (b) and (c) of
Section 324A were satisfied.' Specifically, the court held that "the jury could
conclude that Dow Chemical undertook at least part of the duty, owed to the
Mahlums by Dow Coming, to reasonably ensure the safety of breast
implants."'59  Further, the court also found evidentiary support for the
conclusion that Dow Coming relied on Dow Chemical's chemical testing and
toxicology expertise in developing the implants that injured the plaintiffs. 
60
opinion, but before ajury of her peers who considered the evidence and concluded
that Dow Coming silicone gel breast implants caused her injuries. Thejury in this
case was properly instructed to consider the proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. There is no evidence that the jury did otherwise. Science may properly
require a higher standard of proof before declaring the truth, but that standard did
not guide the jury, nor do we use that standard to evaluate the judgment on appeal.
Id. at 109.
154. Id.atl9n.15.
155. Id. (citing Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 752 F. Supp. 989 (D. Kan. 1990), aftd, 969
F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1992)). Similarly, in Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256,260
(E.D. Pa. 1982), the court found that the fifty years that elapsed between the defendant's
allegedly negligently performed studies of asbestos exposures at the plant at which the plaintiff
was employed and the filing of the plaintiff's complaint alleging negligent undertaking liability
under Section 324A did not "break the causal chain" between the defendant's negligent conduct
and the plaintiff's claim of disease with an incubation period of many years.
156. Mahlum, 970 P.2d at 121.
157. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing issues of causation).
158. Mahlum, 970 P.2d at 121.
159. Id.
160. See id. (noting that Dow Coming lacked a toxicology department for the first six years
in which the company marketed its breast implants).
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Thus finding all required elements for negligent undertaking liability under
Section 324A satisfied, the Mahlum court affirmed the jury's verdict against
Dow Chemical as to that claim. 6'
The Mahlum court's analysis of Dow Chemical's liability under Section
324A is by no means the subject of universal consensus. Indeed, a dissenting
opinion filed in Mahlum cites decisions from other jurisdictions in favor of
Dow Chemical as to essentially identical negligent undertaking claims
involving Dow Coming. 62 For example, approximately six months prior to
Mahlum, the California Supreme Court rejected a Section 324A-based
negligent undertaking claim against Dow Chemical in Artiglio v. Corning
In c. 16 3 The Artiglio court held that plaintiffs allegedly injured by defective
silicone breast implants manufactured by Dow Coming had failed to establish
the duty element of the Section 324A cause of action.164 Specifically, the court
concluded that Dow Chemical's silicone toxicology research on behalf of Dow
Coming was not "an undertaking of such breadth and magnitude as to create a
duty on the part of Dow Chemical to ensure the safety of all of Dow Coming's
silicone products."'165  In contrast with the Nevada Supreme Court's
diametrically opposing view, 66 the Artiglio court emphasized that the many
years elapsing between such research activity and the alleged injuries belied
any claim that Dow Chemical should have reasonably foreseen that such
services were "necessary for the protection of [the] plaintiffs." 67 Accordingly,
the court held that no duty of care under Section 324A running to recipients of




162. See id. at 132 (Maupin, J., dissenting) (discussing cases).
163. Artiglio v. Coming Inc., 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998).
164. Id. at 1320-21.
165. Id. at 1320 (quoting In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab.
Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997)).
166. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Mahlum majority's
treatment of the long period that elapsed between the laboratory tests and the plaintiffs injury).
167. Artiglio, 957 P.2d at 1320.
168. Id. Similar to Mahlum, the California Supreme Court's Artiglio majority opinion was
accompanied by a vigorous dissenting opinion. See id. at 1321 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (invoking
Cal. Civ. Code Section 1714(a) for the principle that duty extends to "everyone" for injuries
resulting from a failure to exercise ordinary care and employing a broader reading of
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A to find that a triable issue of fact existed). In fact,
the Mahlum majority quoted from Justice Mosk'sArtiglio dissent in support of their ruling. See
Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 116 (Nev. 1998) (quoting Mosk's dissent), overruled
in part by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
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Similarly, in a 1997 opinion relied on by both the Mahlum dissent 69 and
the Artiglio majority, the Eighth Circuit rejected Section 324A negligent
undertaking claims against Dow Chemical involving silicone
temporomandibular joint (TMJ) prosthetic implant devices manufactured by
Dow Coming. 7 ° In accepting an argument rejected by the Mahlum court,' 7'
the Eighth Circuit emphasized that under Section 324A the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that Dow Chemical undertook a duty with respect to the specific
product-in this case, silicone TMJ implants-that caused the harm 
at issue. 172
Based on this narrowed view of Section 324A liability, the court asserted that
the plaintiffs' contention that "Dow Chemical undertook a duty with respect to
all of Dow Coming's silicone products" was insufficient.1 73  Instead, for
"liability to attach, Dow Chemical must have specifically undertaken the task of
ensuring the safety of Dow Coming's TMJ implants or of ensuring the safety of
Dow Coming's entire array of silicone products.' 74 Because in its view the
evidence did not support such findings, the court held that Dow Chemical's
toxicological testing of silicone for Dow Coming could not form the basis of a
Section 324A undertaking to protect the eventual recipients of the silicone
products in question.
75
Importantly, however, decisions from other courts are also supportive of
the Mahlum majority's negligent undertaking analysis. The most significant of
these decisions came from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
169. The Mahlum dissent also relied upon the New York trial court case of In re New York
State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 632 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See Mahlum,
970 P.2d at 133-34 (Maupin, J., dissenting) (discussing In re New York State). In re New York
State dismissed claims of negligent undertaking against Dow Chemical brought by recipients of
Dow Coming manufactured silicone breast implants. 632 N.Y.S.2d at 954. However, the New
York Supreme Court for New York County did not analyze the claims under the specific
elements of Section 324A of the Restatement, rendering the decision of somewhat limited value
as precedent outside of claims specifically raised under New York law.
170. See In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d
1484, 1494-95 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Dow Chemical's trademark agreements with, and
silicone research performed for, Dow Coming were insufficient as a matter of law to create a
duty to "ensure the safety of Dow Coming's silicone products").
171. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis by the
Mahlum majority on Section 324A liability).
172. See In re TMJ Implants, 113 F.3d at 1494 (emphasizing that the standard for imposing




175. See id. at 1494-95 (finding that Dow Chemical's trademark agreement with Dow
Coming allowing inspections and its silicone tests outside the medical arena were insufficient to
meet the duty threshold).
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Alabama in In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation. 176
This case involved a federal multidistrict proceeding involving breast implant
litigation against Dow Chemical and Coming, Inc. from diversity jurisdiction
cases then pending "in 90 out of 94 [federal court] districts."' 77 As in the cases
176. In re Silicone Gel Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995). In
addition to In re Silicone Gel, other cases involving scientific testing of chemical substances are
also supportive of the result reached in Mahlum, although their analyses are less in depth than in
Mahlum. For example, Arnstein v. Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n, 414 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Pa.
1976), involved a wrongful death claim brought against a nonprofit trade association and five
chemical companies which employed the decedent. The complaint alleged that the decedent's
death was caused by long term exposure to vinyl chloride during the course of his employment
with the chemical companies. Id. at 13. The trade association, arguing that it owed no duty to
the plaintiff and there was no causal connection between its conduct and the decedent's death,
moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 14. The Arnstein
court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff stated a cognizable cause of action against the
chemical industry trade association under Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A. See id.
at 14-15 (citing Section 324A erroneously as "section 324"). The complaint revealed that the
trade association had conducted testing of vinyl chloride on behalf of its members and "had
recommended a safe exposure level which was allegedly inadequate." Klein v. Council of
Chem. Ass'ns, 587 F. Supp. 213, 224-25 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (discussing assertions of the
complaint in Arnstein that were made part of the record in Klien). On the basis of this pleading,
the Arnstein court held that the plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing a negligent
undertaking claim against the trade association for the wrongful death of the third party
decedent employee. Arnstein, 414 F. Supp. at 15.
Another case supporting Mahlum is Martinez v. Perlite Institute, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 120
(Cal. App. 1975). Although the decision deals primarily with a jurisdictional issue, the
Martinez court recognized the existence of a cognizable third party negligent undertaking cause
of action based on a claim of negligent toxicity testing. See id. at 125-26 (finding it "not
unreasonable" for ajury to conclude that the Perlite Institute may have committed a tort causing
injuries in California, either intentionally or with reasonable foreseeability, thus making
personal jurisdiction over the Institute valid). In Martinez, a trade association was held to have
undertaken a duty of care when it agreed to test a member company's perlite ores for dangerous
toxic substances. Id. at 125. The court found that it was reasonable for the association to
believe that its members would rely on such testing. Id. The court suggested, therefore, that if
this testing undertaking was negligently performed, employees of the association member could
possibly suffer an injury that was proximately caused by the negligence of the trade association.
Id. at 125-26
Another case arguably supportive of Mahlum is Klein v. Council of ChemicalAss 'ns, 587
F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984). In Klein, the court dismissed a Section 324A negligent
undertaking claim against a chemical industry trade association brought by a printing industry
worker employed by certain manufacturers of printing chemicals. Id. at 224-25. However, the
dismissal was based upon the plaintiff's failure to identify a specific chemical to which he was
exposed and which caused his injury. Id. at 224. Nevertheless, the Klein court implied,
favorably citing the example of Arnstein and the plaintiff's identification of vinyl chloride as the
injury causing chemical in that case, that a cognizable cause of action under Section 324A
would have been stated had a specific chemical been identified by the plaintiff. See id. at 224-
25 ("The failure to identify the product and consequently the defendant's conduct with regard to
it required granting the motion to dismiss.").
177. In re Silicone Gel Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455, 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
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discussed above, the plaintiffs alleged that Dow Chemical should be held liable
under Section 324A of the Restatement "for negligently testing and researching
[Dow Coming] silicones for toxicity, biological activity, and safety.',178 The
district court's lengthy analysis of the plaintiffs' Section 324A negligent
undertaking claims was cited subsequently in support of the Mahlum court's
majority opinion. 1
79
As in Mahlum, Dow Chemical asserted in In re Silicone Gel that because
its "research and testing was not specifically performed on breast implants," it
assumed no duty to eventual Dow Coming breast implant recipients." 0 The
district court, emphasizing instead that Dow Chemical's duty "is measured in
terms of reasonable foreseeability," rejected this "restrictive" view of Section
324A. 18 Further, according to the court, the fact that the testing activity in
question occurred prior to Dow Coming's introduction of breast implants did
not prevent Dow Chemical's liability for negligent undertaking.'1 2 The court
emphasized:
Evidence exists upon which a jury could determine that Dow Chemical
knew that its research would be and was being used to market additional
products for human implantation, that the research would be relied upon by
Dow Coming and implant recipients or their physicians, that the research
was necessary for the protection of recipients of Dow Coming medical
devices, and that harm could result if that research was improperly
conducted or reported.1
8 3
IV. Negligent Undertaking Liability Exposure for HPV Challenge
Program Participants
Is the Nevada Supreme Court's Mahlum decision a portent of future
negligent undertaking liability for HPV Challenge Program volunteers? A
definitive answer to this question necessarily would require an injured party
and causal connection to specific allegations of negligent conduct on the part of
a specific actor. Said another way, unless and until such a claim is alleged and
178. Id. at 1460.
179. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 114 (Nev. 1998),overruledinpartbyGES,
Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
180. In re Silicone Gel, 887 F. Supp. at 1460.
181. Id. at 1460-61.
182. See id. at 1460 (emphasizing Dow Chemical's awareness of the issue no later than
1973 due to transfers of key personnel and the close business arrangement).
183. Id. at 1461.
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litigated to judicial resolution, we cannot know for certain. However, whether
participants in the HPV Challenge Program potentially are exposed to such
liability is a question that can be explored in the present. The following
analysis asserts that the undertaking assumed by program participants subjects
each of them to an appreciable risk of future liability under the principles of
Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
A. Threshold Undertaking
As discussed above, the threshold element of Good Samaritan liability




Without an actual assumption of a specific undertaking "there can be no
correlative duty to perform that undertaking carefully."'18 5 In this regard, HPV
Challenge Program volunteers unequivocally undertake to perform certain
specific, well-defined tasks for specific, well-defined purposes. The
commitments undertaken by participants to perform specific toxicology testing
on specific chemicals are set forth in exhaustive detail in the initial framework
agreement,' 8 6 the respective Federal Register notices detailing the requirements
of the program,' 7 the various test plans identifying and describing the actual
chemical testing to be performed, 88 and in other EPA program-related
documents.189 Thus, because the precise nature and extent of the participants'
actual undertakings are well documented, the potential existence and scope of
the participants' concomitant legal duty under Section 324A can be readily
examined.' 90
184. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the first element of Good
Samaritan liability).
185. Artiglio v. Coming Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Cal. 1998) (quoting Blessing v. United
States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1188-89 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
186. See generally Framework for Voluntary Testing, supra note 39.
187. See generally Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV)
Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,687 (Dec. 26, 2000); Testing of Certain High Production
Volume Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,658 (Dec. 26, 2000).
188. See supra notes 64, 77-78, and accompanying text (discussing the scope of HPV
testing).
189. See generally OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, supra note 32; OFFICE OF
POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, supra note 52.
190. See In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d
1484, 1493 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding documented contractual relationships and research
performed to be insufficient to establish a duty to breast implant recipients).
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The HPV Challenge Program's fundamental purpose is to address the fact
that "there is little or no publicly available information regarding the potential
hazards associated with most HPV chemicals."' 9' As the EPA explains:
This lack of available hazard data compromises EPA's and others' ability
to determine whether these HPV chemicals pose potential risks to human
health or the environment, as well as the public's right-to-know about the
hazards of chemicals that are found in their environment, their homes, their
workplaces, and the products that they buy .... EPA believes that for most
of the HPV chemicals, insufficient data are readily available to reasonably
determine or predict the effects on health or the environment from the
manufacture (including importation), distribution in commerce, processing,
use, or disposal of the chemicals, or any combination of these activities.
EPA has concluded that a program to collect and, where needed, develop
basic screening level toxicity data is necessary and appropriate to provide
information in order to assess thepotential hazards/risks that may be posed
by exposure to HPV chemicals.
19
2
Thus, the HPV Challenge Program seeks to assemble basic data about the
potential hazards associated with HPV chemicals to allow the EPA and the
public to "evaluate and prioritize [their] potential health and environmental
effects."' 93
To achieve these purposes, the primary task of participants in the
challenge program is to test various HPV chemicals for toxicity by utilizing
internationally recognized testing endpoints: the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development's SIDS. 94 As the framework agreement
bluntly states, "[w]hen a sponsor signs up to test a chemical or group of
chemicals, the sponsor commits to do all of the testing or provide all of the
information that would be required under SIDS."' 9 s The EPA's Federal
Register notice describing the HPV Challenge Program reflects that this
undertaking is the program's critical aspect. As the EPA emphasizes:
If no data are available for a SIDS testing endpoint, there cannot be
sufficient data to characterize the potential hazards/risks associated with [an
HPV] chemical .... As a result, EPA and others cannot reasonably
determine or predict the human health and environmental effects resulting
from manufacturing, processing, and use of these chemical substances.196
191. Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,686.
192. Id. at 81,687.
193. Id. at 81,686.
194. Id. at 81,687.
195. Frameworkfor Voluntary Testing, supra note 39.
196. Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 65
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B. Standard of Care for Program Participants
Whether such an undertaking gives rise to a legally actionable duty of care
depends, in the language of Section 324A, upon whether the actor "should
recognize" such services "as necessary for the protection" of third parties. 197
Or, as emphasized in Mahlum, a duty is imposed when "it is reasonably
foreseeable that another will be harmed by the failure to exercise reasonable
care in performing" the undertaking. 198 By its very nature, the principal
purpose of the undertaking-toxicology research, which is the subject of the
HPV Challenge Program-is the protection of third parties. The EPA stresses
repeatedly in the written materials describing the program that this research is
needed to evaluate "whether these HPV chemicals pose potential risks to
human health."' 99 The EPA further seeks to empower citizens with knowledge
of whether HPV chemicals "found in their environment, their homes, their
workplaces, and the products that they buy" constitute potential health
hazards.200 Indeed, the urgency-inspiring creation of this voluntary challenge
program by the EPA, Environmental Defense, and the American Chemistry
Council is essentially the same as that ostensibly underlying the creation of
TSCA by Congress-protection of the public from exposure to hazardous
chemicals.2°'
Does this mean that the undertaking for which HPV Challenge Program
participants have volunteered creates a potential legal duty to every member of
the general public? The concept of "reasonable foreseeability" acts as a
constraint on the duty element of the negligence cause of action for the very
purpose of avoiding such potentially limitless liability. 0 2 If a particular risk of
harm is "too bizarre, remote, or extreme," then the requirement that such harm
be reasonably foreseeable is not met, and in the negligence lexicon, no duty of
care is imposed.20 3 Nonetheless, the concept of foreseeability as a limitation on
Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,688 (Dec. 26, 2000).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
198. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 114 (Nev. 1998) (quoting In re Silicone Gel
Prods. Liab. Litig. 857 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (N.D. Ala. 1995)), overruled in part by GES, Inc. v.
Corbitt, 21 P.3d I I (Nev. 2001).
199. Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,687.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (quoting TSCA legislative history).
202. See DoBBs, supra note 83, § 143, at 334 (limiting risks to those that can be foreseen
by a reasonable person); Stuart Madden, Risk!Utility Analysis, 10 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 146,
147 (2000) (noting the importance of the duty element of negligence to the weighing of costs
and benefits).
203. See Madden, supra note 202, at 147 (observing that duty is owed to those subjected to
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duty is, at best, unevenly applied by the courts.20 4 Torts scholars observe that
"[w]hat one court finds unforeseeable as a matter of law, another court will find
foreseeable as a matter of law. ',20 5 One need look no further than the Dow
Chemical negligent undertaking cases for a representative sampling of such
uncertainty. As discussed above, the Nevada Supreme Court and the Northern
District of Alabama found the existence of foreseeable harm to third parties on
essentially identical facts that the California Supreme Court and the Eighth
Circuit rejected as supporting such a finding.2 °6
Moreover, from the defendant's standpoint, and despite its role as a
limitation on liability, foreseeability is nonetheless an expansive concept in
negligence analysis. For example, defendants are not required to foresee the
specific harm that later befalls a plaintiff in order to impose a legal duty of care.
It is enough that a defendant could have foreseen broad categories of potential
risks and harms, rather than the actual specific harm.20 7 Similarly, a defendant
does not have to foresee that her actions are necessary to protect a specific third
party. A duty is owed if the plaintiff falls within a class of third parties "whose
rights were foreseeably affected by the defendant's unreasonable creation of
risk. 20 8 In this regard, cases under Section 324A have demonstrated that a
class of foreseeable third parties "can be quite large and quite remote." 2 9 For
example, in Long v. District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that an electric company contracting with the District of Columbia to maintain
traffic signals had assumed a duty to the "traveling public" as foreseeable third
unreasonable risk of harm when the actor "proceed[s] with an absence of ordinary care").
204. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral ofMacpherson, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 1733, 1776 (1998) (noting that some courts view foreseeability as a jury issue of
breach or proximate cause).
205. Id. Similarly, contributing to the confusion that often surrounds the concept of
foreseeability in negligence law is the fact that "[s]ometimes courts stretch for foreseeability and
sometimes they are narrow or hard-nosed." John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 657, 727
(2001).
206. See supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text (discussing Mahlum and In re
Silicone Gel).
207. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 143, at 335 (noting that the defendant's failure to foresee
specific harm will not relieve him of liability).
208. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REv. 803,808 (2001); see
also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 205, at 685 (stating that "a plaintiff cannot prevail merely
by establishing that the actor's conduct constituted the breach of a duty of care owed to
someone, but must instead show that the breach was a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff, or to
a class of persons including the plaintiff').
209. Dahm, supra note 85, at 102.
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party plaintiffs. 2'0 That is, under Section 324A, any negligent performance of
the company's undertaking to maintain the traffic signals resulting in injury to
any member of the public traveling through the district would allow that person
211to sue the company in tort. In theory, every man, woman, and child in the
United States or even the world could conceivably fall within this class of
foreseeable plaintiffs. Indeed, even in the Mahlum case, the class of
foreseeable plaintiffs-any person who might eventually purchase a silicone
implant product from the manufacturer, Dow Coming-was remarkably broad
and remote.21 2
A helpful construct in examining specific issues of foreseeability relative
to HPV Challenge Program participants is the "relational conception of duty"
advocated by Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky.21 3 According
to this conception of duty, an actor owes a duty of care to another because "that
other person figures (or should figure) in [that actor's] deliberation in a certain
way. 2 14 To avoid "casting the duty net too wide," this construct inquires "as to
which types of [actors] are obligated to be vigilant to avoid causing certain
types of harm to certain others. 21 5 In this regard, "[t]he ease or difficulty for
persons in the defendant's category to anticipate those harms is relevant to
whether it makes sense for such [actors] to be said to have a duty to be vigilant
against causing them., 21 6 Thus, "the decision that certain defendants are
particularly well-situated to foresee the sort of harm that befell the plaintiff' is
"relevant to whether a category of defendant may properly be declared to owe a
duty of due care to a category of plaintiff."21 7 Or, said another way, in certain
210. See Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409,418 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding duty in
light of electric company's "contract to perform services within its field of expertise").
211. See id. at 418-19 (citing a number of other cases with similar facts that had taken
similar positions recognizing such an extremely broad class of foreseeable third party plaintiffs);
see also David v. Broadway Maint. Corp., 451 F. Supp. 877, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that
foreseeable plaintiffs were class of"pedestrians" injured by company's negligent maintenance of
street lights); Fink v. Kasler Corp., 649 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Haw. 1982) (finding that company
contracting with state to maintain stop signs could reasonably foresee class of plaintiffs
including traveling public); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 651 P.2d 585, 597-98 (Kan. 1982)
(finding that power company undertaking to install traffic lights on behalf of city owes a duty to
"automobile passengers" to do so with reasonable care). The ruling in Schmeck has been
superceded by the Kansas Tort Claims Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to 6115 (2003).
212. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (explaining Mahlum's finding that
Dow Chemical was undet duty to exercise reasonable care in testing for chemical safety).




217. Id. at 1838-39.
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cases, "the courts predicate their recognition of a duty of care in part on the
ground that the defendants as a class are uniquely well positioned to foresee the
risk of injury to members of the plaintiff class."218
In applying this relational conception of duty to HPV Challenge Program
participants, the first step is to identify the general class of actors to which these
participants belong. Participants in the program are companies that
manufacture or import certain "industrial chemicals for which aggregate
[domestic] production/importation volumes meet or exceed" one million
pounds annually.219 Participants commit, either individually or as a consortium
of companies working together, to sponsor testing of specific HPV chemicals
manufactured or imported by that company or companies.220 Thus, the class of
actors to which these theoretical defendants belong generally can be
characterized as commercial chemical companies sponsoring toxicity testing of
chemical substances in which they possess specific commercial interests.
The next step is to consider what classes of persons that this class of actors
might be "uniquely well positioned" to foresee why their actions could cause
certain types of harm. Such well-positioned actors owe members of these
classes of persons a duty to take reasonable care to avoid causing such types of
harm.221 Significantly, the EPA's Challenge Program-related documents shed
considerable light on this question. As emphasized above, the fundamental
purpose of the activity engaged in by HPV Challenge Program participants is to
develop data for use in assessing potential hazards to human health from
exposure to specific chemicals. 2 22 The EPA's written program description
indicates that such exposures could occur through such activities as "the
manufacture (including importation), distribution in commerce, processing, use,
or disposal of the chemicals, or any combination of these activities. '0 2 3 Further,
the EPA's program materials indicate that such exposures could occur "where
[citizens] live, work, study, and play" and from "the products that they buy.
2 24
218. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 205, at 727.
219. Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,686 (Dec. 26, 2000).
220. See Browner, supra note 63 (inviting chemical manufacturers or importers to join
HPV Challenge Program).
221. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1838 (explaining that "the foreseeability
of the particular plaintiff's injury to the defendant is relevant to the factual issue of whether the
duty so interpreted has been breached").
222. See supra notes 191-93 (discussing the fundamental purpose of the Program).
223. Data Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,687.
224. Id.
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Given the fundamental purpose of the HPV Challenge Program-to
develop data for use in efforts to determine whether such exposures are
potentially harmful-actors in the category of program participants appear
particularly well situated to foresee the sorts of harm that might befall such
persons should their undertaking be performed negligently. Indeed, as the facts
of Mahlum intimate, a failure to exercise reasonable care in the research and
testing required to develop this data conceivably could create situations
involving harm from chemical exposure that might have otherwise been
avoided. It thus "makes sense for such [program participants] to be said to have
a duty to be vigilant against causing" such harms by negligence in performing
their program-related undertakings.225
Mahlum aptly illustrates application of the relational conception of duty to
an undertaking analogous to that involved in the HPV Challenge Program. As
discussed above, the Nevada Supreme Court found that ajury could reasonably
infer that Dow Chemical should have foreseen that its toxicological testing of
silicone was "a necessary step in the protection of third persons who would
purchase liquid silicone in the form of breast implants. 2 26 Although not
framed in such terms, the court clearly viewed Dow Chemical as within a
category of defendants well positioned to foresee a risk of injury to "the general
class of persons" to which the plaintiff belonged.227 As emphasized by
California Supreme Court Justice Mosk in his Artiglio dissent (cited favorably
by the Mahlum majority), "the general class of persons for whose 'protection'
the actor [performing human toxicological research on substances for
biomedical applications] should recognize his 'services' are 'necessary'...
embraces all those who are subsequently exposed to any such substances,
including plaintiffs who were recipients of Dow Coming silicone breast
implants. 22N Thus, the court considered it proper that a category of
defendants-entities undertaking toxicological research, including Dow
Chemical-be declared to owe a duty of due care to a category of plaintiffs-
all those subsequently exposed to the substance that was the subject of such
research, which included the injured plaintiff in Mahlum.
225. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1838.
226. Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 116 (Nev. 1998),overruled inpart byGES,
Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001).
227. Id.
228. Artiglio v. Coming, Inc., 957 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Cal. 1998) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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C. Breach of Duty
Assuming the duty element is satisfied, the next element in the Section
324A cause of action is breach of that legal duty by a defendant's failure to
exercise reasonable care in performing the undertaking. In the language of
negligence, a defendant breaches a duty of care owed to a plaintiff by engaging
in conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm.229 As with all elements in
a negligence case, the issue of breach-essentially an evaluation of the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct-is broad and general.23°
Evaluation of breach is fact specific, and whether the plaintiff can meet her
burdens of proof and persuasion necessarily must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. Of considerable concern to HPV Challenge Program participants should
be Mahlum's creation of judicial precedent for the proposition that
toxicological research may be conducted in a manner deemed to breach a legal
duty of care owed to foreseeable third parties. As discussed above, the Mahlum
court ruled that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dow Chemical breached
its duty to act with reasonable care based on evidence including that:
(1) certain testing was inadequately performed, (2) testing results were
misreported, (3) assumptions regarding long term chemical safety were based
on animal testing not supporting such suppositions, (4) needed follow up
testing to confirm or reject negative results was not performed, (5) Dow
Chemical failed to advise Dow Coming of the need for such follow up
studies.231
Any determination that HPV Challenge Program volunteers have failed to
exercise due care in performing specific research and testing obligations must,
as emphasized at the beginning of this Part, await specific allegations of
negligent conduct on the part of a specific actor. Nevertheless, warning signs
indicate such occurrences are, at the very least, possible and perhaps even
probable. Groups such as Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine
(PCRM), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, American Anti-
Vivisection Society, and Alternatives Research and Development Foundation
harshly criticize the HPV Challenge Program. These groups and others sued
229. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 15, at 270-71 (noting that defining negligence as
"unreasonable risk" reduces ambiguity related to duty).
230. Id. § 114, at269.
231. See Mahlum, 970 P.2d at 118 (concluding that Dow Chemical "was required to fully
complete ... testing until a reliable safety determination was made"); see also In re Silicone Gel
Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (denying summary judgment
against claim that Dow Coming failed to exercise reasonable care in performing toxicological
testing and research, thus affirming that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to create a
jury question).
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the EPA in 2002 seeking to enjoin the agency from continuing to implement
the program.232 Of primary concern by these groups was the amount of animal
testing that would occur in generating the toxicity data required by the HPV
Challenge Program.23 This objection was based not only on animal welfare
concerns but also on concerns about the accuracy of animal testing as a
predictor of human risk.234 Although the EPA agreed to make changes to
minimize the overall amount of animal testing, animal testing remains a
235substantial part of the testing protocol under the program.
Studies based on experiments on laboratory animals often are utilized in
assessing human health risks posed by potentially toxic chemical substances.236
However, use of animal studies as a predictor of toxicological risks to humans,
even on the level of basic hazard screening, receives harsh criticism and maybe
of questionable value.237 The HPV Challenge Program is condemned
232. See Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Horinko, 285 F. Supp. 2d 430, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on all claims while
granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment).
233. Id. at 434.
234. Id. at 434-35; see also Neil Barnard, Editorial: Challenge EPA Toxicity Tests-An
Urgent Call, PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., Winter 1999 (inviting readers to
contact Vice President Gore), available at http://www.pcrm.org/magazine/GM99Winter/GM99
Winter8.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. See Physicians Comm., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 435 ("Plaintiffs dispute whether HPV
Challenge Program was changed at all to minimize the amount of animal testing performed.");
PHYSICIANS COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME
CHALLENGE: INDUSTRY VIOLATIONS AND EPA NEGLIGENCE 3-5, 7-8 (2001) (describing
agreement and the EPA's reluctance to enforce the agreement), available at
http://www.pcrm.org/ resch/anexp/hpvreport0801.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The changes to the program relating to animal testing were negotiated between
the animal protection community and the creators of the HPV Challenge Program (EPA,
Environmental Defense, and the American Chemistry Council). Andrew Nicholson et al., An
Evaluation of the US High Production Volume (HPV) Chemical- Testing Programme: A Study
in (Ir)Relevance, Redundancy and Retro Thinking, 32 ATLA (SuPP. 1) 335, 335-36 (2004).
Despite the claims that animal testing is reduced significantly through this agreement, reviews of
HPV test plans conducted since that agreement demonstrate that substantial animal testing
continues to take place. See id. at 339 (noting that calculations are based on an OECD report).
236. Jack L. Landau & W. Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility of
Animal Studies to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAHO L. REv. 521,533 (1989);
Mark E. Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 409,433-34 (1995); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 119-20 (1994) (explaining that animal experimentation is considered the first step
in scientific risk assessment for human toxicity).
237. See Shere, supra note 236, at 433 (noting criticism of the "premise that massive
dosage studies on animals provide a direct basis for evaluating human risks"); see also M. ALICE
OTTOBONI, THE DOSE MAKES THE POISON: A PLAIN-LANGUAGE GUIDE TO TOXICOLOGY 58 (2d ed.
199 1) ("The proposition that data obtained from animal experimentation can be applied directly
and quantitatively to humans is so obviously flawed that it has had no proponents until
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vigorously on this same ground. In testimony before the House Committee on
Science, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, PCRM President Neal
Barnard argued that the HPV Challenge Program was fundamentally flawed
because "animal tests are often so inaccurate that they do more harm than
good. ' 238 Dr. Banard cited a Swedish research trial involving 29 independent
laboratories and 50 chemical substances that found that rodent studies were
only 65% accurate in predicting human toxicity risk.239  Because of this
significantly high frequency of inaccuracy in animal tests, Dr. Barnard
expressed concern that the HPV program could "in fact be used to exonerate
toxic chemicals" as potential risks to human health.240 Dr. Barnard cited as an
example early animal studies on tobacco smoke as a carcinogen. Because
inhalation studies involving animals failed to indicate any hazardous results,
such tests allowed the erroneous interpretation that tobacco inhalation was not
dangerous to humans.24'
There are, indeed, numerous examples of chemical substances later proven
to be hazardous to human health but that initially were the subject of animal
studies indicating no such risk.242 Although the industrial solvent benzene was
eventually shown to cause leukemia by studies of exposed workers, earlier
relatively recently."); Christopher H. Buckley, Jr. & Charles H. Haake, Separating the
Scientist's Wheat from the Charlatan's Chaff: Daubert's Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,293, 10,301 (1998) (describing the skepticism of courts regarding "probative
force" of animal studies); Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 236, at 522 ("Using animal studies
to predict human toxicity responses is, at best, a primitive procedure which rests upon
assumptions about the nature of toxic reactions and the biological relationship between humans
and animal species that have never been reliably confirmed."). Similarly, Judge Jack Weinstein
remarked on the limited value of animal studies in the Agent Orange toxic tort case as follows:
"The animal studies are not helpful in the instant case because they involve different biological
species. They are of so little probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be
inadmissible." In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). Notwithstanding such criticism, as Professor Wendy Wagner has observed that "animal
studies have proven very enlightening in some cases." Wagner, supra note 5, at 779 n.24 (citing
DAVID BRUSICK, PRINCIPLES OF GENETIC TOXICOLOGY 109-10 (1980)).
238. EPA 's High Production Volume (HPV) Chemical Testing Program: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Energy and Env't of the Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong. 38 (1999)
[hereinafter EPA Hearing] (statement of Neal D. Barnard, M.D., President, Physicians
Committee for Responsible Medicine).
239. Id. at 38-39 (citing the Multicenter Evaluation of In-Vitro Cytotoxicity (MEIC) trial
based in Uppsala, Sweden, conducted by Dr. Bjom Ekwall and colleagues).
240. Id. at 37.
241. Id. at 38.
242. See generally id. at 103 (statement of Animal Legal Defense Fund, a national
organization of lawyers, law professors, law students and paralegals) (asserting that "[f]alse
negatives.., are a serious problem in animal testing, which even the Interagency Coordinating
Committee for the Validation of Alternative Methods (ICCVAM) has recognized").
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animal studies were unable to demonstrate such a link.243 Asbestos is a known
human carcinogen, but decades of animal studies on asbestos demonstrated no
evidence of risk.24 The chemical betanaphthylamine, linked to a 100% bladder
cancer rate in workers exposed to the substance over a five-year period, was not
indicated to be a human health risk based on previous animal studies. 245
Arsenic has long been an accepted human carcinogen, but animal studies have
never suggested such a risk.2" Such a checkered history has led to suggestions
that attempts to predict human toxicity risks based on animal studies are
"something of a crap shoot."247 Indeed, given assertions that more accurate
testing methods are presently available, potential plaintiffs are likely to seize
upon program participants' use of testing described as "a grossly inaccurate
measure of human risk" to argue that such conduct in and of itself should be
deemed to create an unreasonable risk of harm to foreseeable third parties.248
In addition, negligent conduct by participants undertaking toxicology
research within the HPV Challenge Program is always possible through old-
fashioned methods of inadvertence and carelessness. Past investigations by the
Food and Drug Administration indicate that animal and clinical toxicity test
results submitted by industry sponsors or toxicology laboratories working for
such sponsors often contained deficiencies caused by inadvertence, faulty
design, inadequate training, improper data handling, and "poor and sloppy"
procedures.249 A 2003 status report on the HPV Challenge Program prepared
243. See Shere, supra note 236, at 422-23,438-39 (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. API, 448
U.S. 607,618 (1980), and Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5925,5932 (1978)
as instances where this link was unable to be demonstrated).
244. Id. at 439.
245. Id.
246. Buckley & Haake, supra note 237, at 10,302; Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 236,
at 544.
247. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 236, at 544; see also EPA Hearing, supra note 238,
at 242 (statement of Neal D. Barnard, M.D., President, Physicians Committee for Responsible
Medicine) (responding to Republican Subcommittee members' post-hearing questions and
stating that certain type of animal testing method (LD-50) "is grossly inaccurate in predicting
human toxicity in more than one-third of cases").
248. See EPA Hearing, supra note 238, at 38-40 (discussing human cell testing that was
shown by the results of the MEIC trial to be approximately 80% accurate as a predictor of
human toxicity); see also id. at 80-83 (transcript of discussion) (describing existing alternatives
to animal testing including methodologies asserted as showing "clear-cut superiority" to certain
types of animal tests); id. at 104 (quoting Animal Legal Defense Fund that "Congress did not
intend whole animal testing to be perpetuated when non-animal testing alternatives exist which
are cheaper, more accurate, and more reliable").
249. Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A
Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155,
166-68.
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by Environmental Defense offers some disturbing foreshadowing for program
participants in this regard. The report sharply criticizes the performance of
some individual companies, consortia, or trade associations, asserting that
"[t]he quality of test plans and robust summaries submitted to date is decidedly
mixed, ranging from excellent to unacceptable.2 50  Of further concern,
deficiencies in toxicology research also are attributed to bias or even outright
fraud by industrial researchers.2  Commentators observe that "industrial
researchers have incentives to withhold negative information or to perform
poorly designed and executed experiments incapable of revealing negative
information.0 52 Whether serious flaws in research design or performance were
inadvertent or deliberate, either would unquestionably constitute a breach of a
duty to exercise reasonable care in the performance of an HPV Challenge
Program participant's undertaking.
D. Cause-in-Fact
Even if the conduct of HPV Challenge Program participants meets the
requisite liability standard, plaintiffs must next prove that such a failure to
exercise reasonable care was the cause-in-fact of their physical injuries. As in
Mahlum, a plaintiff bringing a Section 324A-based cause of action necessarily
must address two distinct concerns in this regard. First, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that exposure to the HPV chemical in question was the actual
cause of their injuries. Second, the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that
the defendant's negligent conduct in performing its HPV Challenge Program
undertaking with respect to that chemical was also an actual cause of their
physical injuries.253 That is, the plaintiffs must be able to further establish that
but for the program participant's negligent conduct, the plaintiffs would have
avoided their injury.254
250. DENsoN & FLOTrNi, supra note 35, at ix (emphasis added).
251. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 103, 137 n. 169 (stating that toxicological data supplied by
regulated industry "may be biased or even outright fraudulent"); Lyndon, supra note 6, at 1816
(stating that "deception certainly occurs" with toxicity data produced by industry sources "and is
often perceived as widespread").
252. DAVID D. DONiGER, THE LAw AND POUCY OF TOXac SLIBsrANcEsCoNTROL 15 (1978);
see Shapiro, supra note 249, at 166 (describing FDA investigation revealing "deliberate
decisions which seemingly were calculated to minimize the chances of discovering toxicity" in
animal testing data submitted by industry researcher to the FDA).
253. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing this dual burden for the cause-
in-fact element of the plaintiffs' negligent undertaking claim in Mahlum).
254. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining the but-for portion of the
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The first of these causation issues "is the acid test of any toxic tort
lawsuit. ,255 Toxic tort harm typically arises from "occupational, environmental,
or consumer exposures" to hazardous chemicals, products, or wastes. 256 In the
context of the link between exposure and injury in a toxic tort case, proof of
causation requires that the plaintiff establish two things: "first, that the
particular substance involved is capable of causing the type of injury that
plaintiff suffered; and second, that exposure to the substance did, in fact, cause
plaintiff's injury., 2 57 However, because of the scientific uncertainties plaguing
cause-and-effect issues in toxic tort cases, a myriad of "unique and
troublesome" issues render proof of causation an often difficult issue for
injured plaintiffs to overcome.258 Such difficulty, often related to such factors
as the lapse of time between exposure and the onset of symptoms
demonstrating injury and imperfect knowledge of disease etiology,25 9 likely will
create significant problems for any potential plaintiffs bringing Section 324A-
type claims against HPV Challenge Program participants. However, despite the
difficulties associated with causation problems in toxic tort cases, such issues
260are by no means an impossible barrier to recovery. Indeed, Mahlum is itself
conclusive corroboration of this fact. Moreover, even in toxic tort cases, the
issue of causation is not always problematic and, on occasion, "is quite clear-
cut.v261
E. Proximate Cause
The final issue for consideration under Section 324A is whether a failure
to exercise reasonable care in the undertaking is the proximate cause of a
plaintiffs physical harm. Traditional negligence analysis utilizes proximate
Mahlum analysis).
255. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 236, at 521.
256. Wagner, supra note 5, at 777.
257. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 236, at 526.
258. See id. at 527 (noting that "problems arise out of the current lack of conclusive
information about the nature of the human toxic response"). For extended discussions of the
typical causation problems in toxic tort cases, see Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN.
L. REV. 1219, 1226-28 (1987) (discussing problem of linking the defendant to chemical
exposure); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 855-59 (1984) (analyzing problem of
"alternative possible sources of the plaintiff's injury").
259. GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic
TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 5 (2d ed. 2001).
260. Farber, supra note 258, at 1234.
261. Id. at 1251.
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cause to limit the scope of a defendant's legal responsibility for harm caused by
careless conduct under appropriate circumstances.2 62  That is, even if a
defendant breaches a duty of care owed to a plaintiff, the injury caused by that
carelessness may be too remote or unforeseeable or too far removed from the
scope of risk created by the defendant's conduct to merit imposition of
liability. 263 Given the considerable disagreement among scholars and courts
often arising over the proper approach to proximate cause, this concept can
sometimes prove one of the more conceptually difficult negligence elements to
resolve.2 4
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, simplifies this issue
considerably in Section 324A, which sets forth three specific sets of
circumstances in which the defendant's breach of duty owed to third parties
may be found to be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical injury.
Unless the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that at least one of these three
conditions applies, no liability attaches under Section 324A even if the plaintiff
has demonstrated otherwise the existence of legal duty, breach, cause-in-fact,
and physical injury. Subsection (b) of Section 324A-when a volunteer
undertakes to perform a duty owed to a third party by the entity on whose
behalf the specific services are rendered-does not appear to apply to the
circumstances of the HPV Challenge Program.265 However, subsections (a) and
(c)--when the volunteer's breach of duty increases the risk of physical harm to
a third person or such harm is suffered because of reliance on the undertaking
by either the third person or the entity for whom the services are rendered--do
appear potentially applicable.
Regarding subsection 324A(a), the Restatement's official commentary
states, "[i]f the actor's negligent performance of his undertaking results in
increasing the risk of harm to a third person, the fact that he is acting under...
a gratuitous agreement with another will not prevent his liability to the third
person., 266 Thus, where an HPV Challenge Program participant conducts
262. PAGE, supra note 99, at 30.
263. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 204, at 1837.
264. See PAGE, supra note 99, at 2 (observing "a notable lack of consensus" among jurists
and scholars on the subject of proximate cause); see also DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW 382 (1963) (observing as to this issue that "j]udges not only disagree with judges; and
professors with professors and judges; it is a field where a professor may disagree with
himself').
265. There appears to be no basis for the contention that the EPA is itself legally obligated
to perform toxicity testing on the HPV chemicals that are the subject of the HPV Challenge
Program. Thus, the program participants voluntarily performing such testing at the agency's
behest are not performing a duty owed by the EPA to third persons.
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A cmt. c (1965).
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toxicity testing in a negligent fashion and a member of a foreseeable class of
third parties is subsequently injured by exposure to that substance, the
participant would be liable if a court deemed the negligent conduct increased
the risk of harm to the third party. Although Mahlum does not address this
specific issue, other courts have applied this aspect of Section 324A's
proximate cause standard in analogous circumstances.
For example, in Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp.,267 a
nonprofit service organization routinely undertook to test products of
manufacturers to determine whether such products met certain manufacturing
requirements and safety standards. 26' The testing organization periodically
listed products it deemed to comply with these standards in publications
available to the public and also authorized manufacturers to label such products
to convey the same information.269 An individual, injured as a result of an
exploding fire extinguisher previously listed and labeled by the organization,
brought this action against the organization. In denying summary judgment
for the defendant, the court held that the testing organization could be held
liable under Section 324A because "[t]he alleged failure ... to exercise
reasonable care in approving the design of the extinguisher has obviously
increased the risk of harm to plaintiff over that which would have existed if
reasonable care had been exercised.
2 71
In Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp.,272 an insurance company research group
performed a series of studies on asbestos exposure among workers at an
asbestos plant.273 Fifty years later, plant workers suffering asbestos-related
health disorders sued the insurance company under Section 324A alleging
negligent performance of these studies.274 In denying the insurance company's
motion for summary judgment, the court held that "a jury could infer [from the
evidence] that the 'empirical studies' conducted by [the research group] ...
were, in fact, inaccurate and skewed by industry representatives in order to
avoid the legal effect of asbestos exposure among workers. ' 275 The court
267. Hempstead v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
268. See id. at 116 (discussing the nature and purpose of Underwriters' Laboratories, one
of the named parties to the suit).
269. See id. (noting that companies may attach labels to approved products stating
"Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., Inspected").
270. Id. at 110-11.
271. Id. at 118.
272. Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
273. Id. at 257-58.
274. See id. at 258 (noting acceptance of Section 324A in Pennsylvania courts).
275. Id. at 259.
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further indicated that the plaintiff had adduced facts tending to show that the
defendant, "recognizing the study as necessary to protect [the asbestos plant's]
workers, produced it with a lack of reasonable care in drawing its conclusions,
thereby increasing risk of harm to plaintiff.
2 76
Similarly, Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.277 involved a parent
company undertaking to provide health and safety information regarding all
chemicals used at its subsidiary's manufacturing plant.278 A plant employee
suffering an "occupational disease" (ostensibly due to chemical exposure at the
plant) sued the parent company asserting negligent undertaking liability under
Section 324A. 279 The Heinrich court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss,
finding that the alleged facts stated a cognizable claim under Section 324A(a)
in that the defendant's negligence resulted in an increased risk of harm to the
plaintiff.280  Cases such as Hempstead, Kohr, and Heinrich suggest that
negligently performing an undertaking involving safety or health risks,
including as to potentially hazardous chemical exposure, may be seen as
increasing the risk of harm to foreseeable plaintiffs. For the same reasons,
toxicity research undertaken by HPV Challenge Program participants falls
squarely within the scope of Section 324A(a)'s increased risk of harm test for
proximate cause.
Alternatively, subsection 324A(c) allows proximate cause to be found if
physical harm is suffered because of reliance on the undertaking by either the
entity for whom the services are rendered or the injured third party.28' The
official Restatement commentary elaborates that:
This is true whether or not the negligence of the actor has created any new
risk or increased an existing one. Where the reliance of the other, or of the
third person, has induced him to forgo other remedies or precautions
against such a risk, the harm results from the negligence as fully as if the
actor had created the risk.282
For a plaintiff to establish "reliance" for purposes of subsection 324A(c), courts
typically require evidence of some detrimental change in position by the party
alleged to have relied on the undertaking. 83 Importantly, the underlying
276. Id. at 258.
277. Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Md. 1982).
278. Id. at 1350-51.
279. Id. at 1350, 1354.
280. Id. at 1355-56.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(c) (1965).
282. Id. cmt. e.
283. See Wellington & Camisa, supra note 99, at 55-57 (discussing court interpretations
requiring a change in position to constitute reliance).
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purposes for the HPV Challenge Program demonstrate that reliance by both the
EPA and third parties is a fundamental characteristic of the program.
The EPA, for whom the "services" in question are being rendered, already
has expressed unequivocally its intention to rely on the respective undertakings
of HPV Challenge Program participants. Throughout the written program
materials, the EPA repeatedly emphasizes its objective to rely on the data
generated by program participants to evaluate and prioritize potential human
health and environmental effects resulting from manufacturing, processing, and
use of HPV chemicals.284 Should the EPA rely on negligently performed
testing by HPV Challenge Program participants such that it chooses to forgo
further evaluation or heightened prioritization regarding certain chemicals later
deemed to have caused physical injury to foreseeable plaintiffs, then the
requirement of subsection 324A(c) is met. Heinrich illustrates this point
regarding an analogous undertaking to provide health and safety information
regarding chemicals used at a manufacturing plant. The court emphasized that
"liability may be imposed under section 324A(c) if, for example, [the
subsidiary] relied upon [the parent's] information and services such that [the
subsidiary] lessened, or omitted taking, its own safety measures regarding the
chemicals as to which information was supplied by [the parent].
2 85
Furthermore, the intentional design of the HPV Challenge Program
provides that third parties may also specifically rely upon the testing and
research undertakings of program participants. The EPA's stated goal is to
make data generated by program participants available to the public "to
empower citizens with knowledge about.., chemicals [they] may be exposed
to in the places where they live, work, study, and play. 28 6 Indeed, in its 1998
study on the lack of basic toxicity information on domestic HPV chemicals, the
EPA emphasized that a fundamental reason for making this type of information
publicly available is "so that producers, users, workers, and consumers could be
aware and be able to evaluate the hazards and risks posed by the chemicals they
encounter in their daily lives. 2 87 Significantly, the report further emphasizes
that "[s]teps to ensure the availability of basic toxicity information on HPV
chemicals would be an integral part of meeting" the objective of "improv[ing]
the ability of the public to reduce exposure to specific environmental and
284. See supra notes 192-93, 196, and accompanying text (discussing the goals and
methodology of the Program).
285. Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (D. Md. 1982).
286. Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV) Chemicals, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,687 (Dec. 26, 2000).
287. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, supra note 29, at 2.
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human health risks. '28 8 The launch of the HPV Challenge Program a mere six
months following release of this report was clearly a deliberate "step" in this
direction.289
As observed above, the HPV Challenge Program is a central element of
the EPA's larger Chemical Right-to-Know initiative. 290 The initiative's basic
goal is to "assure that the public has access to health and environmental effects
data for chemicals which are present in their environment., 29' Thus, the
initiative is a close relative to federal and state right-to-know laws which have
proliferated during the last few decades.292 The underlying premise of right-to-
know policy is to allow individuals to make "informed decisions" regarding the
presence of hazardous substances in their environments.29 Thus, "[a]t least in
theory, workers can take precautions, bargain with their employers for safety,
suggest safer procedures, refuse certain work, or even change jobs.
2 94
Similarly, "[i]n theory, access to information about environmental contaminants
enables individuals and community groups to take appropriate action to
minimize adverse health risks. 2 95 Such action might include avoiding areas
where hazardous chemicals are located or minimizing exposure to media or
products contaminated by such chemicals.296 In the case of data generated by
HPV Challenge Program participants, however, reliance on negligently
produced or reported data may induce individuals to forgo such actions or to
otherwise decide against taking precautions against exposure to chemicals in
288. Id.
289. The EPA's 1998 Chemical Hazard Data Availability Study was released in April
1998. Id. at 1. The HPV Challenge Program was announced on October 9, 1998. Data
Collection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,692.
290. Id. at 81,687.
291. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, supra note 32.
292. See Applegate, supra note 3, at 294-95 (discussing federal right-to-know laws);
Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-to-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making
and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1987) (discussing
federal, state, and municipal right-to-know mandates).
293. Edwards, supra note 292, at 8; see also Applegate, supra note 3, at 297-98
(describing ways in which citizens might use data provided by right-to-know statutes).
294. Applegate, supra note 3, at 297; see Edwards, supra note 292, at 8 ("The underlying
premise is that informing workers of the effects of work-related hazardous chemical exposure
will enable 'workers to play a meaningful role in their own health management.'").
295. Robert F. Blomquist, The Logic and Limits of Public Information Mandates upon
Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy Analysis, 14 VT. L. REv. 559, 562 (1990); see
Applegate, supra note 3, at 297-98 (stating that "by providing toxicity and exposure
information paralleling quantitative risk assessment, the data requirements of the right-to-know
laws encourage individuals to undertake their own, informal risk assessments").
296. Blomquist, supra note 295, at 562.
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their local environments.297 Or, similar to allegations made in Mahlum, injured
consumers may assert that reliance on favorable toxicity data induced continued
purchases of products containing hazardous HPV chemicals where such
purchases would have been otherwise avoided.2 9 These and other similar
assertions by individuals alleging reliance on an HPV Challenge Program
participant's undertaking are sufficient to meet the proximate cause standard of
Section 324A(c).
V. Conclusion: Policy Implications for the EPA
This Article reveals an unintended consequence of the joint creation of the
HPV Challenge Program by the EPA, Environmental Defense, and the
American Chemistry Council. Companies and consortia voluntarily sponsoring
toxicity testing on specific HPV chemicals are exposed to common law tort
liability under the "negligent undertaking" principles of Section 324A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Accordingly, liability for latent harms caused
by potentially toxic chemicals outside of the traditional product liability context
exists for HPV Challenge Program participants. Similar to Dow Chemical in
Mahlum, the mere act of conducting scientific research on a chemical substance
renders program participants potentially answerable in damages for injuries
allegedly caused by products that these companies may not manufacture or by
other forms of chemical exposure for which they otherwise would not be
directly responsible.
This prospect most certainly would have affected the decisionmaking
process of industry participants if contemplated contemporaneously with their
commitment to the HPV Challenge Program. Indeed, "exposure to lawsuits
and potentially catastrophic liability" based on traditional toxic tort theories
contributed to the unwillingness of industry to conduct voluntary toxicity
research before the inception of this program.2 99 Similar industry concerns over
297. A further complicating factor is the open question of whether individuals have the
ability "to make intelligent use" of toxicity information disclosed through such programs in any
event. Applegate, supra note 3, at 297; see also Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1653-54, 1672, 1702 (1995) (discussing limitations
of the general public to understand scientific information based on deficiencies in science
education and training).
298. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 119-20 (Nev. 1998) ("Charlotte
Mahlum also testified that had she known of the significant health hazard posed by liquid
silicones, she would have refused Dow Coming's breast implants."), overruled in part by GES,
Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d I I (Nev. 2001).
299. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 775 (describing common law incentives for companies
to minimize chemical safety research).
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other types of increased liability exposure minimized levels of participation in
previous EPA voluntary programs. 3°° Significantly, the mere threat of
litigation, even if only the prospect of frivolous lawsuits, deterred industry
participation in such voluntary programs.30' A defendant that prevails in a
lawsuit of even questionable merit may yet incur enormous litigation costs in
the process. For such reasons, the probability that plaintiffs' attorneys will
ultimately utilize Mahlum and Section 324A as a road map to lawsuits and
aggressive pursuit of monetary liability creates substantial negative incentives
for continuing or future industry participation in the HPV Challenge
Program.
30 2
In this regard, a June 2004 status report by Environmental Defense
identifies more than 150 chemicals falling within the scope of the existing
program that were either never sponsored or had initial sponsorships
withdrawn.30 3 In addition, more than 600 chemicals emerging as HPV
chemicals since commencement, and thus not technically within the scope of
the program, also remain unsponsored. 304 Environmental Defense argues that
producers or importers should sponsor voluntarily the testing and research
called for in the HPV Challenge Program for these and any additional
chemicals reaching HPV status in the future.30 5 The EPA echoes this call with
the optimistic suggestion that such voluntary testing of subsequently emerging
HPV chemicals should "become routine. 30 6 However, such future voluntary
300. See Case, supra note 42, at 54 (noting widespread industry fears of citizen
enforcement actions); Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 5, at 147-49
(discussing the concern of industry regarding the vulnerability of Project XL participants to
citizen suits as a deterrent to participation).
301. Case, supra note 42, at 54; see also Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the
Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 533, 542 (2002) (suggesting that fear of
frivolous lawsuits is a deterrent to voluntary disclosure of information by public companies).
302. Indeed, personal injury lawyers in the toxic tort arena continually seek to evolve new
legal theories to expand the number of potentially liable companies for the harmful effects of
toxic substances. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Congress Should Act to Resolve the National
Asbestos Crisis: The Basis in Law and Public Policy for Meaningful Progress, 44 S. TEx. L.
REv. 839, 859-60 (2003) (discussing this phenomenon in relation to liability exposure for
asbestos).
303. DENISON, supra note 26, at ii. Environmental Defense reports that, as of June 2004,
532 chemicals from the original program list were unsponsored and that as many as 259 of these
were "true orphans: chemicals for which their producers and importers have not met their
responsibility to sponsor.., under the program." Id. at ii-iv.
304. Id. at vi. As of June 2004, 735 new HPV chemicals had emerged since the launch of
the HPV Challenge Program, 112 of which were subsequently voluntarily sponsored by
program participants. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at v (quoting U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, supra note 82).
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collaboration may be seriously, perhaps fatally, compromised by the "negligent
undertaking" liability exposure that would accompany any such undertaking.
The EPA's ability to initiate future voluntary chemical research and testing
programs based on the HPV Challenge Program model similarly is threatened.
And, of more immediate concern, belated knowledge that participation in the
HPV Challenge Program increases exposure to lawsuits and potential liability
may cause current participants to attempt to withdraw existing commitments.
Materialization of such threats to the existing HPV Challenge Program or
to future participation in similar efforts would continue a frustrating tradition
for the EPA's utilization of collaborative approaches to environmental
policymaking. Since the early 1990s, industry participants denigrated high
profile EPA voluntary programs such as the 33/50 program, Project XL, and
the Common Sense Initiative for low participation rates. 30 7 Scholars attribute
this problem to a combination of insufficient incentives to motivate industry
participation and the existence of adverse incentives causing industry to
perceive participation as undesirable.30 8 Such minimal participation rates are
among explanations offered as to why past EPA voluntary programs disappoint
both in terms of results and impact.30 9 The perception that EPA voluntary
programs are largely insignificant and ultimately ineffectual will be furthered
should the problem revealed by this Article eventually derail the HPV
Challenge Program or similar future collaborative regulatory efforts.
Eventually the EPA must consider what course of action, if any, to take in
response to such concerns. Taking no action at all is, of course, one possible
307. Case, supra note 42, at 47 n.293, 47-48. Low participation rates by industry in
voluntary environmental programs are not limited to EPA programs. For example, the voluntary
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) of the European Union, a scheme where
companies voluntarily adopt standard procedures for environmental management, auditing, and
reporting in exchange for limited regulatory controls, has also suffered from an extremely low
participation rate by industrial companies across the European Union. See David W. Case,
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 19, on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) (reporting participation at less than 1%).
308. Case, supra note 42, at 47-48, 54; see also Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation, supra note 5, at 124-25, 149-50 (noting criticism of Project XL, particularly the
legal uncertainty of some of its provisions).
309. See Case, supra note 42, at 46-48 ("As long as participation in reinvention programs
continues to be voluntary, failure to develop more compelling incentives to motivate industry
participation eventually may render external regulatory reinvention programs at the EPA a
pointless exercise."); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1286
(1995) ("Without meaningful incentives to impel widespread participation, purely voluntary
programs will likely have no more than a marginal impact on basic environmental programs.");
Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 5, at 196 (suggesting use of EPA
regulation as a "negative incentive" that may compel industry compliance).
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option. That is, the EPA can choose to do nothing and allow the tort system to
function as it will with respect to the undertakings of participants in the HPV
Challenge Program. As discussed above, however, such an approach is not for
the risk averse. Achieving the desired policy objectives of the HPV Challenge
Program certainly will be more difficult and perhaps impossible if the program
erodes or even collapses from the weight of participant withdrawals. Moreover,
ignoring incentives for industry avoidance of voluntary participation in
chemical testing efforts threatens the EPA's ability to effectively pursue these
policy objectives through collaborative approaches in the future.
Another option is for the EPA to abandon voluntary approaches altogether
in seeking to achieve the specific policy objectives at stake--developing and
utilizing previously unavailable data on the effect of chemical substances on
human health and the environment. Instead, the EPA can seek to obtain such
information solely through TSCA, which was ostensibly created by Congress
for that purpose. However, as discussed in Part I of this Article, TSCA is
widely viewed as a failure in this regard.3 10 TSCA's elaborate procedural
barriers, burdensome evidentiary standards, and corresponding vulnerability to
expensive and time-consuming judicial challenges by industry create strong
incentives for the EPA to avoid promulgation of test rules under TSCA.31
Indeed, these weaknesses of TSCA as a regulatory instrument are among the
primary motivations for creation of the HPV Challenge Program in the first
place. A decision to simply abandon such collaborative approaches achieves
nothing more than a return to the unsatisfactory regulatory status quo that the
HPV Challenge Program was intended, at least in part, to rectify.
A final option is for the EPA to seek to reduce the negative incentives for
voluntary participation in collaborative chemical research and testing efforts
created by Mahlum and the negligent undertaking principles of Section 324A.
This approach would prove a difficult undertaking, given that alleviating the
burdens of such legal liability would require some type of action by Congress.
An example of a previous federal program that might inform the EPA's
consideration of such a possibility is the National Swine Flu Immunization
310. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing failure of TSCA to achieve its
goal of correcting deficiencies in chemical toxicity data).
311. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (describing evidentiary burdens placed
on the EPA in conjunction with TSCA).
312. See DENISON & FLoRIN1, supra note 35, at I (referencing "sporadic" exercise of EPA
authority under TSCA as preamble to creation of HPV Challenge Program); see also ENVTL.
DEF. FUND, supra note 15, at 23, 29 n.15 (criticizing regulatory efforts under TSCA). This
report created substantial momentum for the subsequent discussions and eventual agreement
with the EPA to create the HPV Challenge Program. DENISON & FLORIN, supra note 35, at 1.
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Program of 1976.3'3 In March 1976, President Ford announced a large scale
federal immunization program to stem an expected outbreak of a deadly swine
flu virus.31 4 Drug manufacturers and public health officials collaborated to
develop a vaccine for the program.31 5 However, before the distribution phase
of the program could commence, manufacturers and distributors of the vaccine
expressed reluctance to participate based on concerns about exposure to legal
liability for potential injuries associated with the vaccine.316
To alleviate these concerns, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims
Act to require claims for injuries caused by the vaccine to be brought directly
against the federal government.31 7 The relevant provision states:
[T]he liability of the United States arising out of the act or omission of a
program participant may be based on any theory of liability that would
govern an action against such program participant under the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred, including negligence, strict
liability in tort, and breach of warranty.318
Although accepting liability for injuries resulting from the vaccinations, the
government reserved the right to seek indemnity from manufacturers for any
finding of negligence on the part of a program participant. 319 Thus, the
legislation completely absolved program participants from any claims of strict
liability in tort under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts but
not as to claims based on common law negligence.320 This provision tended to
alleviate the most serious liability concern of the vaccine manufacturers and
required that they obtain insurance covering their liability arising from
negligence. 32' Notwithstanding the government's right to seek reimbursement
313. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 380,90 Stat. 1113
(1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247bj)-(I) (2000)). For a detailed discussion of the
circumstances leading up to this program, see Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., Liability for Vaccine
Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations and Some Reflections on the Swine Flu
Experience, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 44,62-69 (1977).
314. H. William Smith Ill, Note, Vaccinating Aids Vaccine Manufacturers Against
Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 207,219-20 (1992).
315. Id. at220.
316. See id. (discussing unwillingness of manufacturers to bear risks of product liability
suits); see also Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act. Model Compensation Legislation?-
The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv 1, 55 (1989) (describing
manufacturers' refusal to release vaccines without insurance or indemnification).
317. Smith, supra note 314, at 220-21.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
319. Smith, supra note 314, at 221.
320. See Berkovitz, supra note 316, at 55 (detailing how potential liability for faulty
vaccines was spread across the public at large, rather than solely to producers or victims).
321. Smith, supra note 314, at 221.
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of damages from a negligent program participant, no such reimbursement has
been sought.322
Certainly, an imminent public health crisis made the circumstances
surrounding the Swine Flu Program far more exigent than those surrounding
the HPV Challenge Program. Moreover, the type of liability concern in the
former program-product liability-is altogether different from the liability
concern that is the subject of this Article-negligence in performing toxicity
testing. Nonetheless, both programs involve important public health concerns
and a "challenge" from the federal government for companies to act voluntarily
to address such concerns notwithstanding significant exposure to lawsuits and
liability accompanying any undertaking to do so. Further, similar to vaccines,
toxicity research has the potential to provide tremendous societal benefits.323
The voluminous literature of the past few decades on the dearth of basic
chemical health effects toxicity data and the accompanying adverse effect on
government policy and regulation suggest that the policy goals underlying the
324HPV Challenge Program are of no less public import.  Thus, the fact that
Congress willingly removed the deterrent of legal liability to participation in the
former program at least establishes precedent supporting some form of
325analogous action in this instance.
Nonetheless, a decision to immunize actors from liability for negligent
conduct that causes physical injury to innocent victims runs counter to this
country's common law traditions of corrective justice.326 If an actor's fault
322. John P. Wilson, The Resolution of Legal Impediments to the Manufacture and
Administration of an AIDS Vaccine, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495,552 (1994).
323. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Windowfor the Future, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387,388 (1987)
(describing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act as addressing "a crisis situation that
existed for products that provide tremendous societal benefits").
324. See supra notes 3-29 and accompanying text (discussing benefits stemming from
improved chemical toxicity data).
325. Indeed, Congress is no stranger to utilizing its Commerce Clause power to impact
common law tort liability rules to address specific problems affecting national policy concerns.
See Schwartz et al., supra note 302, at 842-47 (discussing a number of federal statutes that
preempted state tort laws). Congress has done so on numerous occasions over the past century.
Id. at 842-57 (chronicling dozens of statutory schemes enacted by Congress over the past
century in this regard).
326. See Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility: Coleman's Liberal Theory
of Commutative Justice, 103 YALE L.J. 861, 871 (1993) (discussing interpretation of tort law
including the "central thesis... that modem tort law gives legal expression to our informal
social practice of corrective justice"); see also DOBBS, supra note 83, § 9, at 13-16 (discussing
ideals of corrective justice concept of tort law); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DuKE L.J. 56, 60-61 (1993) (explaining nature and definition of
corrective justice).
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causes harm to a specific individual, conceptions of corrective justice require
that the wrongdoer compensate the injured party in order to, in theory, "restore
[those] persons to the status quo ante. 3 27  As Professor Jules Coleman
emphasizes, "[c]orrective justice imposes a duty to repair wrongful losses on
those agents responsible for them.
3 21
Under what circumstances, then, would it be fair and equitable to deviate
from this conception of corrective justice and in some way assuage the burdens
of liability normally imposed upon negligent wrongdoers? One interpretation
of corrective justice theory addresses this question, in part, by asserting that
"corrective justice does not require a particular mode of rectification. 3 29
Indeed, "[a]ny way of annulling wrongful... losses is permissible provided it
does not create other corrective injustices. 330 Under this "annulment thesis,"
the fundamental concern of corrective justice is making the injured victim
whole. 331 Other concerns-"such as holding persons responsible for their
actions"-are "secondary and derivative" of this fundamental aim.332 Thus, "if
anyone, wrongdoer or not, compensates the [injured party], corrective justice
has been done. 3 33 Said another way, "[o]nce the loss is redressed, nothing
remains for corrective justice to do."3 34 Significantly, such secondary concerns
as imposing the loss on the party responsible for it "do not survive satisfaction
of [corrective justice's] fundamental aim.
335
327. Radin, supra note 326, at 57. Professor Radin further emphasizes:
[C]orrective justice means to make required changes in an unjustified state of
affairs between an injurer and a victim, when the injurer's activity has caused the
injustice, so that such changes bring about ajust state of affairs between them, and
one that is related in a morally appropriate way to the status quo ante. A shorthand
way of saying this is that corrective justice restores moral balance between the
parties. From this perspective, tort law is an engine for bringing about corrective
justice by requiring tortfeasors to make recompense to their victims. This view of
tort law is not couched in market rhetoric. Its core concepts are rights and wrongs,
not dollars and exchange.
Id. at 60.
328. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 329 (1992).
329. Id. at 365.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 365-66 (distinguishing this "annulment thesis" conception of corrective
justice from the "mixed view" that states that holding wrongdoer responsible for repairing
wrongful losses is the only way to implement corrective justice); see also Postema, supra note
326, at 885 (discussing Professor Coleman's view of the fundamental concern of corrective
justice).
332. Postema, supra note 326, at 885-86.
333. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 9, at 15 n.8.
334. Postema, supra note 326, at 886.
335. Id.
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Accordingly, when public policy concerns warrant government action to
reduce or eliminate the burdens of liability for a negligent wrongdoer,
corrective justice still may be accomplished through such means as legislation
(as occurred with the Swine Flu program, for example) or a government
mandated insurance program addressing the compensation needs of victims.
3 3 6
Thus, a legislative response from Congress reducing or even eliminating the
negligent undertaking liability concems of HPV Challenge Program
participants may be consistent with conceptions of corrective justice. This
response assumes that appropriate provisions will be made to compensate for
physical injury suffered by any victims of such negligence, similar to the
scheme established for the Swine Flu program.
If the EPA pursues this track, however, the agency must convince
Congress that threats to public-private partnerships such as the HPV Challenge
Program implicate policy concerns justifying such legislative action. Indeed,
the EPA must demonstrate that a legislative response to the liability exposure
concerns at issue is "in the public interest, and not simply ... a 'bailout' for an
alleged wrongdoer." 3" In this regard, the EPA should consider the underlying
rationales for the ubiquitous Good Samaritan statutes that exist in every state
and at the federal level. 338 The most well known of such statutes provides
absolute or qualified immunity to those who voluntarily render emergency
medical assistance from liability for injuries caused by the failure to exercise
reasonable care in performing such assistance.339 Similar Good Samaritan
statutes have been passed to limit negligence liability for those who cause harm
while performing various voluntary services and undertakings.340 Statutes
passed by Congress in this regard include the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997
336. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 9, at 15 n.8 (noting that under the view that any
compensation of a victim constitutes corrective justice, the state or an insurance company could
compensate a victim); see also COLEMAN, supra note 328, at 364-65 (discussing authority of
government to act for reasons grounded both in consideration of corrective justice and other
policy concerns).
337. Schwartz et al., supra note 302, at 842.
338. Christopher H. White, Note, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Case for Reform
of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 507, 517 (2002) (noting that states recognized the
injustice and uselessness of a system that punishes altruistic acts); see also DOBBS, supra note
83, § 252, at 663-64 (noting that the original purpose of such statutes was to encourage
physicians to provide voluntary assistance in emergencies without fear of liability).
339. Barry Sullivan, Some Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Good Samaritan Statutes,
8 Am. J.L. & MED. 27,28 (1982). Some of these statutes limit coverage solely to physicians or
trained medical professionals, while others extend coverage to all persons attempting to render
assistance. White, supra note 338, at 517.
340. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 283, at 765-66.
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(VPA),341 immunizing individuals who undertake volunteer work for nonprofit
organizations and governmental entities for harm caused by ordinary
negligence in the course of such work,342 and the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan
Food Donation Act,343 providing limited negligence immunity for harm caused
to third parties due to good faith donations of grocery products and food to
nonprofit organizations for ultimate distribution to needy individuals.
344
Each of these statutes reflects legislative determination that application of
the common law Good Samaritan doctrine is socially harmful public policy in
certain circumstances. In such cases, the legislature recognized that application
of this doctrine-which, as emphasized above, encompasses the principles of
Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts345-unwisely deters
socially beneficial conduct.346  For example, congressional findings
incorporated directly within the VPA emphasize that the willingness of
volunteers to participate in nationally important social service programs "is
deterred by the potential for liability against them. 3 47 Further, absent statutory
protection, "high liability costs and unwarranted litigation costs" and
"legitimate fears ... about frivolous, arbitrary, or capricious lawsuits"
discourage volunteers from providing services.348  Accordingly, Congress
asserts that limiting the liability risk assumed by such volunteers is within the
national interest because citizens depend on these programs and the federal
government lacks capacity to perform such services otherwise.349
In a similar vein, the paucity of available toxicity information on chemical
substances commercially used in the United States has been well chronicled.35°
341. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14,501-05 (2000).
342. Id. § 14,503. Immunity does not apply to harm "caused by willful or criminal
misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the
rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer." Id. § 14,503(a)(3).
343. 42 U.S.C. § 1791 (2000).
344. Id. § 179 1(c). A donor is not protected for "injury to or death of an ultimate user or
recipient of the food or grocery product that results from an act or omission of the person,
gleaner, or nonprofit organization, as applicable, constituting gross negligence or intentional
misconduct." Id. § 1791(c)(3).
345. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text (comparing the Good Samaritan
doctrine with Section 324A).
346. See White, supra note 338, at 517 (noting that states recognized the injustice and
uselessness of a system that punishes altruistic acts).
347. 42 U.S.C. § 14,501(a)(1) (2000).
348. Id. §§ 14,501(a)(6), (a)(7)(A).
349. Id. §§ 14,501(a)(7)(B), (C).
350. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (describing Environmental Defense
Fund and EPA studies that recognized a lack of toxicity information available for chemicals
used commercially in the United States).
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The adverse effect of these information deficiencies on the national effort to
regulate in the critical areas of public health and environmental protection is
also well documented. 351 The federal government's capacity and resources to
generate this information directly are extremely limited,352 and its primary
regulatory scheme for correction of this problem is considered in some quarters
a "fundamental failure. 353 Thus, if the HPV Challenge Program and similar
future collaborative efforts can generate such critically needed information
efficiently and cost effectively, enormous public policy benefits necessarily will
follow. Such benefits place encouragement of voluntary participation in the
HPV Challenge Program and similar future efforts squarely within the national
interest. Thus, national policymakers should consider a legislative response to
the deterring effect of the liability risk assumed by HPV Challenge Program
participants under the negligent undertaking principles of Section 324A.
351. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (citing several articles that address
uncertainty and inefficiency in the environmental regulatory process due to lack of information).
352. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (noting that limited state and federal
budgets would constrain necessary toxicological investigations but that the private sector has
adequate resources to conduct such investigations).
353. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 15, at 23.

